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Abstract 
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) has seen a remarkable growth in recent 
years - primarily in the US and UK, but also in other markets including 
Australia. This growth, along with the development of corporate social 
responsibility, is suggested to be a result of increased awareness in social, 
environment and human rights issues. The literature offers several suggestions as 
to how SRis and SRI funds may differ from other investments, as financial 
assets. It has been suggested that SRis are more likely to represent smaller 
stocks, and also more likely represent growth rather than value stocks compared 
to non-SRis. Furthermore, different hypotheses are presented on whether SRis 
are likely to give higher or lower returns than other investments. Such 
assumptions have implications for portfolio diversification in regards to SRI 
funds. This study investigates whether there is evidence to support the 
assumption that Australian SRI funds are different, from a financial asset 
perspective, compared to non-SRI funds. 
A sample of six general and four superannuation SRI funds is surveyed, and 
compared to a general managed fund benchmark index and a superannuation 
fund benchmark index. A four-factor Jensen alpha is used to assess fund 
performance, providing little evidence of any consistent and significant 
differences in returns between SRI funds and the respective benchmark indices. 
Returns-based style analysis is applied in order to detect differences between the 
SRJ funds and the benchmark indices in exposures to asset classes and industry 
sectors. The results show little notable consistent patterns of differences in 
investment style, but provide mild support to the assumption of SRI funds having 
heavier exposures to smaller stocks. Also, the SRI funds tend to have higher 
exposures to cash compared to the relevant benchmark indices. 
The most prominent result from the study is that the SRI funds differ markedly 
amongst themselves in terms of exposures to asset classes and industry sectors. 
They can therefore not be categorised under any particular investment style 
category, and should not be treated as a homogenous asset class. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) is far from a new concept. The active 
selection of where funds are allocated based on social, religious, and/or 
environmental criteria has been practiced for decades by religious, educational and 
other similar institutions as well as by individuals. The development of these 
investments from being a niche activity to becoming more mainstream is however 
fairly recent, and at different stages of maturity in different markets. The U.S. market 
arguably represents one where SRI has now reached maturity and is widely available 
to the public. The U.S. SRI industry is supported by a strong information 
infrastructure compared with other markets where the industry is still in the early 
stages of development (Shapiro, 1992; The Allen Group, 2000 1). 
While the SRI industry in the UK and Europe is at a stage of development 
closely following the US, Australia represents a market where SRI has only just 
started to gain foundations amongst investors, their advisers and fund managers. This 
"delay" in development has been blamed partly on the smaller market compared to 
the US, the UK and Europe (Birkensleigh, Proske, Kazakoff and Kendrick, 2000; 
The Allen Group, 2000). 
A distinction between what has been called first and second generation 
socially responsible investors has been suggested when describing the development 
of socially responsible investing. Whilst the first generation of socially responsible 
investors might have been more likely to be willing to accept greater risks and lower 
returns compared to other investments, the second generation of these investors 
cannot so easily be described in this way (The Allen Group, 2000). Research has 
revealed that a larger proportion of today's socially responsible investors are 
expecting similar risks and returns from their Socially Responsible Investments 
(SRis) as they do from other comparable investments (Beal and Goyen, 1998). 
1 The heavy reliance on the report written by The Allen Group in this paper stems from the limited 
existing literature on SRI, especially with particular reference to the Australian market. This report 
arguably provides the most comprehensive report to date on this topic, and thus represents an 
important source of information. 
The so-far developed theory on SRI does, however, provide some reasons 
why screened investments may differ from non-screened investments, as financial 
assets. There are two contradictory hypotheses on how screened investments may 
perform differently from un-screened investments. The "green-penalty" assumption 
holds that "the bad guys make more money than the good guys", whereas the "green­
dividend" hypothesis hold exactly the opposite, namely that there are financial 
rewards for corporate social responsibility (Gottsman and Kessler, 1998). It has also 
been suggested that SRis may have different style-characteristics, and that these 
investments are more likely to be smaller market capitalisation stocks, and also more 
likely to have lower book-to-market value (i.e. they are more likely to be classified 
as growth stocks) (Kurtz, 1997). Screened funds may also incur higher diversifiable 
risk than non-screened funds due to a smaller investable universe (Anderson, 2000). 
Whilst some research has been provided on the performance of SRI funds, as 
well as a few other aspects of such investments, most of this has applied to the U.S. 
market (e.g. Teper, 1992; Guerard, 1997; Gottsman and Kessler, 1998). Also, there 
are some potential problems in this line of research, in particular with regards to 
comparability of benchmarks. Some research has been undertaken on whether 
socially responsible corporate management leads to better market performance (e.g. 
Angel and Rivoli, 1997; Feldman, Soyka and Ameer, 1997; McGuire, Sundgren and 
Schneeweis, 1988). Very little such research has been undertaken for Australian SRI 
funds, although this is perhaps rather due to a lack of well-established SRI funds than 
a lack of interest. It is difficult to draw reliable conclusions about fund performance 
without a reasonable history of fund returns on which to base such research. Whilst 
the literature on SRI fund performance is presently in its early stages of 
development, there are considerable areas to be explored. No empirical work has 
been done on style characteristics of these funds, in spite of several suggestions 
having been made in the so-far developed theory. 
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1.1 The purpose of this study 
1.1.1 Hypotheses to be tested 
This study investigates the market behaviour of ten Australian SRI funds, six 
ordinary managed Australian equity SRI funds and four superannuation Australian 
equity SRI funds. The benchmark used for the general funds and the superannuation 
funds are the Morningstar Australian Equity Trusts - General (MAETG) and the 
Morningstar Superannuation Australian Equity - General (MSAEG) indices, 
respectively. 
The objective of this study is to investigate whether there is sufficient 
evidence to support the hypothesis that SRI funds, as financial assets, behave 
differently to other comparable managed funds in the market. Evaluating the relative 
performance of these funds is not of primary interest in this study, but is reported as 
very few previous studies exist. Rather, the style analysis of the included SRI funds 
is the primary issue, and will provide indicators of the funds' exposure to asset 
classes and market sectors. The specific hypotheses to be tested are therefore: 
H01: Raw returns and variances are the same for SRI funds as for 
comparable non-SRI funds; 
H02: Risk-adjusted performance is the same for SRI funds as for 
comparable non-SRI funds; and 
H03: SRI fund exposures to asset classes and investment styles are 
consistent with the MAETG and MSAEG indices. 
1.1.2 Why is this important? 
It is important that SRI funds are marketed and treated as what they are from 
a financial asset perspective. However, the available literature reveals investors, 
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professionals and academics offering greatly differing descriptions of the attributes 
of such funds. 
One important question arising from reviewing the available literature is 
whether SRis and SRI funds represent a specific "asset-class" distinguished from 
other investments in terms of return, variability of returns and other fundamental 
financial measures, i.e. whether SRis represent a homogenous group of investments 
in terms of style. The literature presents various attempts to categorise SRis under a 
separate asset class or investment style, but with differing results as to what asset 
class or style. 
There is an urgent need for empirical research on the financial characteristics 
and behaviour of such investments. This is particularly important for the 
superannuation members, due to the importance of these funds to individuals. 
SRI fund performance has been evaluated with differing degrees of reliability 
and using a wide variety of methods. This study provides a framework and evidence 
from a sample of the existing Australian SRI funds, particularly in terms of 
investment style, which is an area largely unexplored in empirical studies on SRI. 
1.2 Background to the study - the development of a new industry 
1.2.1 What is Socially Responsible Investment? 
SRI is defined differently by different sources and among academics, fund 
managers and other professionals. Whilst the terminology includes concepts such as 
"ethical investment", "green investment", "environmentally screened investment", 
and "social investing", 'SRis' appears to be a more general term for investments that 
are screened using ethical, social and environmental criteria. 
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Shapiro ( 1992 p. 10) defines socially responsible investing simply as "the 
practice of making investment decisions based on both financial and social 
performance" as well as "the concept of investing in concert with your principles". 
FTSE4Good (2001) defines socially responsible investment as "an investment 
strategy that takes into account a company's ethical, social and environmental 
performance as well as its financial performance". 
The Ethical Investment Association (EIA) provides one definition of ethical 
investments and one of SRis. Ethical investment "gives investors a choice, enabling 
them to make investment decisions without compromising their own ethical 
concerns". Socially responsible investments are defined as "integrating personal 
values and societal concern with investment decisions"2 (The Ethical Association 
Newsletter, February 2001 p. 2). 
Ellman ( 1997) distinguishes between two other types of socially responsible 
investing. Ethical investing, also referred to as socially-screened investing, is defined 
as "the placement of mon·ey in mutual funds, stocks, bonds or other securities or 
other investments that are screened to reflect ethical, environmental, social, political 
or moral values." Ethical investing is distinguished from alternative investing 3, 
which is defined as "the placement of money in businesses or investments reflecting 
a vision of an alternative kind of economy". 
Tower Managed Funds (200 1) addresses potential socially responsible 
investors, and defines socially responsible investing as being "about integrating your 
values with your investment decisions". 
2 EIA further suggest "SRI considers both the investors financial needs and an investment's impact on 
society". EIA states that the term SRI is commonly used in America and Europe, and that in Australia 
this term is used interchangeably with ethical investment (The Ethical Investment Association, 
February 2000 p. 2). 3 Alternative investors are suggested to "generally place money in co-operative or community­
oriented enterprises such as worker or consumer co-ops, co-operatively-owned financial institutions, 
regional development bonds, not-for-profit enterprises or community loan funds. Alternative investors 
want their investments to help create local jobs, develop local enterprises, provide essential service or 
empower workers or consumers" (Ellman, 1997). 
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1.2.2 Screening practices 
The criteria on which SRis are selected are typically referred to as investment 
screens. The industry distinguishes between positive and negative screens. Screening 
typically falls under social, environmental, human rights, or political criteria. Other 
selection procedures include Targeted Funds and Best-of-Sector approach, which 
both represent forms of positive screening. These approaches are described 
hereunder. 
Negative screens 
Negative screens are selection criteria where fulfillment of these implies 
exclusion from the portfolio. These avoidance-criteria typically include involvement 
in industries such as the tobacco, alcohol, gaming, armaments, nuclear power and 
uranium mining and pornography industry. Other than involvement in particular 
industries negative screens may exclude investments in organisations representing 
undesirable business practices, such as polluters or organisations with questionable 
labour ethics (The Allen Group, 2000; The Ethical Investment Association 
Newsletter, 2001; Anderson, 2000). 
Positive screens 
Positive screens are selection criteria where fulfillment of these implies 
inclusion into the portfolio. This is a more proactive approach, typically aiming to 
include sectors such as education, health, public transport and renewable energy. 
Positive screens may also apply to individual firms where firms with particularly 
good records on areas such as labour ethics, environmental consideration, and 
community involvement are included into the portfolio (The Allen Group, 2000; The 
Ethical Investment Association Newsletter, 2001; Anderson, 2000). 
SRI fund managers are likely to use multiple screens and both negative and 
positive screening. Negative screens have, however, historically been the most 
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commonly used. They are also arguably easier and less costly (in terms of 
information requirements) to implement. It is recommended fund managers use both, 
and that promoting and encouraging companies that are more proactively involved 
with corporate social responsibility, and social and environmental issues in general, 
is important and should be a part of the objectives of SRI implementation (Waddock 
and Graves, 2000). 
Targeted Funds 
Targeted Funds invest in companies involved in particular industries or with a 
particular line of business. An example of this may be funds investing in renewable 
energy stocks (Saleeba and Proske, 2000). 
Best-of Sector 
The Best-of-Sector approach is a type of a positive screen where the best 
performing companies, based on set social, environmental or ethical criteria, in every 
industry are included into the portfolio. This approach ensures that all industries are 
represented in the portfolio so as to eliminate potential risk associated with over and 
under-exposure to industries (The Allen Group, 2000; The Ethical Investment 
Association Newsletter, 2001; Anderson, 2000). 
Potential problems with screening 
Problems with negative and positive screens may arise in a number of areas. 
Problems of increased and unjustifiable information-costs may arise in markets 
where corporate transparency is low and ability to obtain information on where 
companies derive their revenues is limited. This problem will be less potent in 
markets with a more comprehensive infrastructure for information related to 
companies and SRI criteria, such as that emerging in the US and also in Europe (The 
Allen Group, 2000). The Australian market, on the other hand, is still experiencing 
some teething problems in this context. 
7 
Another problem arises from the fact that some companies, especially large 
ones, may be conglomerates with lines of business contradicting selection criteria. In 
other words, a company may derive a certain percentage of its earnings from a line of 
business that should be avoided using certain screens. Whereas a company may 
perform well on one criterion that is of a central concern for a group of investors, it 
may not perform well on other criteria of concern (The Allen Group, 2000). 
The Allen Group (2000) suggests that a maximum limit of 5% of revenue 
derived from the sale of alcohol and tobacco will allow major retailers to be included 
in the investable universe. It is further suggested that such practice may be important 
for smaller markets such as Australia as the universe may otherwise become too 
limited, and may increase risk and attract a return penalty. 
The Best-of-Sector approach has been exposed to some controversy because 
it includes all sectors of the market, including those that are normally seen as 
undesirable. Key arguments for this approach include the diversification argument, 
and also that this approach gives companies in otherwise questionable sectors a 
chance to improve their performance in regard to SRI criteria, so as to become 
eligible for inclusion into SRI portfolios (The Allen Group, 2000). 
1.2.3 The evolution of socially responsible investing 
The history of investment screening can be traced back to the seventeenth 
century, where the Quakers were the first to apply social screens to their investments 
in North America. In the interest of making sure their investments were not 
supporting practices which violated their views on, for instance, slavery, investment 
screens excluding such activities were used (Kinder and Domini, 1997). In the early 
1900s the American Bible Belt was actively screening out "sinful" activities such as 
alcohol, tobacco and gaming - which indeed are the most common negative screens 
today (Papmehl, 2001). 
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Shapiro ( 1992) suggests four stages of the development of social investing in 
North America. The first stage, from the 1920s to the early 1970s, comprised the 
earliest encounters with avoidance-investors. The first South-Africa resolution (based 
on the apartheid regime) is listed as an important event, as well as the founding of the 
first socially screened mutual fund, the PAX World Fund in 1971, established by a 
group of Methodist clergy. Other important developments mentioned include the 
Dreyfus Third Century Fund, the Council on Economic Priorities, and the South 
Shore Bank of Chicago (and its community involvement). 
The next stage comprised the 1980s where the ethical issues of fund 
allocation were developing into a movement. The Social Investment Forum was 
founded, regularly published print media on the issues of social investing were 
released, and institutions such as Franklin Research & Development, the Investor 
Responsibility Research Center and the Institute of Community Economics were 
founded. Retail SRI funds and trusts started to emerge. 
The Allen Group (2000) refers to the first socially responsible investors as 
first generation socially responsible investors. These investors are suggested to have 
been more willing to forgo financial returns, and more demanding in regard to 
screening, than are socially responsible investors today. 
The third phase of the development of social investment comprised the late 
1980s until the beginning of the new millennium, and describes the SRI movement 
becoming more mainstream. The success of the South-Africa divestiture movement 
is described as an important driver in this process. Throughout this phase SRI is 
generally recognised as "a prudent, long-term investment strategy producing 
comparable returns in a balanced portfolio" (Shapiro, 1992 p. 17). Whilst negative 
screens are described as the most commonly used, Shapiro suggests there is an 
increasing interest and demand for positive, proactive investments. SRis are 
increasingly being marketed through mainstream brokerage firms, the media 
coverage of SRis is becoming more balanced, and environmental investing is said to 
have replaced divestment as the second international SRI issue. 
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The establishment of the UN principles of sustainability also represents an 
important development within this stage. The United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED), held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992 
resulted in signed agreements and agendas, all in the name of sustainable global 
development. The Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD) was created in 
December 1992 to ensure efficient follow-up of UNCED. The CSD supports and 
encourages governments and international organisations in their work toward 
ensuring sustainable development (United Nations Sustainable Development, 1999). 
The Allen Group (2000) refers to the socially responsible investors in the 
later stages of the development of the SRI industry as second generation socially 
responsible investors, and suggests that these investors are more likely to demand 
similar returns on their SRis as on non-SRis, and less demanding in terms of 
screening criteria. 
The fourth phase comprises the twenty-first century, where Shapiro (1992 p. 
17) suggests "SRI is business as usual", and where the development of the SRI 
industry as reached its maturity in the US. 
This sounds much like a success story for SRI products in the US. Australia, 
on the other hand, is lagging behind in this context, although some important 
developments have taken place, such as the establishment of the Ethical Investor 
Association (EIA) and the Ethical Investor magazine. The first screened investment 
fund available on the wholesale market in Australia was the Warakirri Charitable 
Australian Equities Trust, established on June 1st 1983. The Challenger Socially 
Responsible Investment fund and the Australian Ethical Balanced Trust were both 
offered on the retail market in 1989, the former representing an asset management 
firm adding an SRI alternative to the existing product-line, and the latter representing 
an asset management firm specialising in SRI as their primary line of business 
(Ethical Investor, 2001 ). 
10 
--1.2.4 The recent growth in the SRI industry 
The growth in the US and the UK 
The U.S. and the U.K. SRI industries have both experienced a significant 
growth in recent years. Anderson (2000) and Birkensleigh, Proske, Kazakoff and 
Kendrick (2000) report that SRis in the US grew by 82% from 1997 to 1999 to reach 
US$2. 16  trillion. SRis account for roughly 1 3% of the $ 16.3 trillion under 
professional management in the US. 
The UK has experienced a similar trend with a reported growth of 47.7% 
from 1998 to 1999. FfSE4Good (2001) reports that there are more than 50 ethical 
retail funds in the UK alone, and that the value of these funds grew from £199.3 
million in Q2 1989 to £3.7 billion in Q4 2000 (an increase of over 1750% ). U.K. 
retail ethical funds under management are projected to be worth £ 10  billion by 2003. 
Other countries having experiences comparable trends include Canada, 
Germany and France. The Allen Group (2000 p. 14) reports US$3.8 billion invested 
in 14  ethical funds in Canada, US$2.2 billion in ethical funds in Germany, and 30 
existing SRI funds in France4 • 
Drivers behind this growth 
Traditionally, managers have been concerned primarily with shorter-term 
profit maximisation and maximisation of shareholders' wealth and consumers have 
been concerned primarily with the practical product-specific utility of products and 
services. This has changed dramatically over the last few decades, and both 
managers and consumers have widened their perspectives on how business practice 
4 These countries seem to be experiencing different trends in terms of screening procedures. Whereas 
the US and the UK focus most predominantly on screens on tobacco, alcohol and weapon-production, 
Canada and the other European countries seem to focus mostly on environmental issues (The Allen 
Group, 2000). 
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and consumption impacts on the community and the environment. Consequently, this 
has resulted in consumer, as well as investor, activism5 • 
Krumsiek ( 1997) explains the emergence of the SRI industry with heightened 
awareness of social issues. Citizens of the developed world now have a much higher 
awareness of their health, the environment and labour issues than fifty years ago. The 
health hazards associated with tobacco, the environmental hazards of pesticides and 
herbicides and the potential benefits of organic food are issues that have only been 
discovered and discussed in the last few decades, and human rights issues, such as 
the use of cheap labour in developing countries, have gained public awareness only 
recently. Consequently, people are now much more aware of, and interested in, how 
and where the consumption-dollar is distributed. 
Krumsiek ( 1997) also suggests that a segment of the baby-boomer generation, 
referred to as the "cultural creatives", represents an important driving force behind 
the development and growth in the SRI industry by combining "a serious concern 
about their inner lives with a strong penchant for social activism" ( 1997 p. 26) 6• 
Apart from the reasons suggested by Krumsiek, it may also seem possible that an 
increased standard of living, where individuals on average have more time and 
money to their disposal, has contributed to consumer and investor activism. 
Social awareness is clearly very important in today's society, and this is likely 
to be reflected in business life (see, for instance, Krumsek, 1997; and Moskowitz, 
1997). Krumsek ( 1997 p. 27) suggests that "today's social concerns quickly become 
tomorrow's  financial concern". Educated consumers are very likely to become 
educated investors, and raising capital is an important part of business. 
5 Investor activism (or shareholder activism, which is the term EIA uses) is described as "the lobbying 
by company shareholders, either singly or in groups, for change in the way the company conducts its 
business" (The Ethical Investor Association Newsletter, 2001 p. 2). 
6 This segment arguably represents one-fourth of American adults, they are "overwhelmingly female, 
more likely than average to be college graduates, relatively affluent, and on the cutting edge of social 
change" (Krumsiek, 1 997 p. 26). Also, the cultural creatives are arguably increasingly seeking to 
understand how their consumption decisions affect their lives. 
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--Governments are, of course, important in the development of this industry. 
Consumer concerns are reflected in political concerns, and the legal frameworks to 
support and encourage the emerging industries are being developed in many markets. 
The U.K. Pensions Act 1995, which requires pension fund trustees to disclose 
in their Statement of Investment Principles the plan's approach to SRI, provides an 
example of how such concerns have resulted in government intervention. This is not 
a requirement to offer ethical investments but rather to disclose whether ethical 
considerations are taken into account in the plan's investment strategy (Anderson, 
2000). 
1.2.5 SRI in Australia 
In comparison to the substantial growth of SRis in the US and the UK, 
Australia's  experience has not been as impressive. There is, however, reason to 
expect growth among SRis in Australia in the future. Figures on the size of the 
Australian SRI industry vary greatly with estimates from $250 million (Anderson, 
2000) to $300 million, and around $1 billion when church-based investments are 
included 7 (The Allen Group, 2000). 
In Australia, SRI currently only accounts for a very small proportion of the 
total amount invested in managed funds, both general and superannuation, and only a 
few SRI funds are available. The Allen Group (2000) reports that ethical funds 
represent approximately 0.7% of equities in professionally managed funds in 
Australia, and that there are large potential opportunities for growth in this segment 
of the market - particularly when bearing in mind that SRis account for 13% of 
7 The Allen Group (2000) suggests these figures to be underestimates, since they do not include retail 
investors who buy i ndividual shares using ethical screens. Also, not-for-profi t bodies such as 
churches, foundations and universities may account for around $20 million, and therefore represent a 
significant proportion of these estimates. Such variation in estimates of the market size may result 
from differing operating definitions of screened investments. 
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funds under management in the US. The funds on offer are limited in numbers and 
diversification across the range of possible asset classes ( e.g. bonds and property). 
This lagged take-up on SRI has been explained by Australia being relatively 
slow in taking up financial innovations in general and also by the relatively small 
market size (The Allen Group, 2000). It is suggested that strong growth will 
accelerate as the wholesale market increasingly recognises the opportunities in SRI. 
On the demand side, it is suggested that the Australian market is lagging behind also 
in awareness of social, ethical and especially environmental issues, and that the a 
lack of pressure to adopt socially and environmentally responsible production and 
management practices on firms has held back this development (Birkensleigh et al., 
2000). 
Recent studies on the attitude to SRI in the Australian managed fund industry, 
however, suggest the SRI industry will experience strong growth in the near future. 
A survey conducted by the Investment and Financial Services Association revealed 
that 45% of investment management firms were planning to add a new SRI offering 
to their product-line within the following 12 months (Liondis, 2001). Furthermore, 
an industry survey suggests 13% of superannuation trustees are considering screened 
investments for their portfolio in the near future, and around 70% of superannuation 
trustees regard SRis as a legitimate investment class (Seleeba & Proske, 2000). 
Ethical Investment {2001) lists 2 1  Australian retail SRI trusts on offer as at 
September 200 1, of which 12 are Australian share funds. 1 1  superannuation SRI 
funds are listed, two SRI insurance bond funds, and eight wholesale funds. 
So far the history of, and growth in, the SRI industries in the U.S., U.K., 
European and Australian markets have been briefly accounted for. The next chapter 
will discuss the existing literature on the characteristics of SRis, in comparison to 
other investments, as financial assets. 
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--2. A REVIEW OF THE AVAILABLE LITERATURE ON SRis 
2.1 SRI and Finance Theory 
2.1.1 SR/s and investor behaviour 
The fundamental theory 
Mainstream financial theory hinges on the assumption that investors have one 
source of utility, and that this source is expected terminal wealth, measured by 
financial return, and one source of disutility, and that this source is risk, measured by 
the variability of returns. Thus investment decisions are made in a two-dimensional 
space, where return on investment is maximised and the returns variability is 
minimised by choosing investments that are mean-variance efficient. Rational 
individuals should therefore choose a mean-variance efficient investment given the 
information available, and choices between alternative investments will be made on 
these two criteria. A risk-averse investor should choose the investment with an equal 
or greater expected return and an equal or lesser risk, where one of these inequalities 
must be strict. This investment will thus dominate the other and will be the superior 
investment. Presented mathematically, investment A dominates investment B if 
and ( 1 ) 
and at least one inequality is strict, and where E(rA) represents the expected return on 
investment A, E(r8) represents the expected return on investment B, aA represents the 
variability of returns on investment A and a8 represents the variability of returns on 
investment B (Bodie, Kane and Marcus, 1999). 
The theory of mean-variance efficiency of investments originates from 
Markowitz ( 1952; 1976) and his famous work on rational investor behaviour and 
portfolio selection. This work has since dominated the development of traditional 
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---finance theory as we know it. The strict validity of this theory has, however, been 
questioned in later years ( see, for instance, Markowitz, 1976)8. However, financial 
return and returns variability are still assumed to be the only sources of investors' 
utility and disutility. One important fact is still left unaccounted for: What about 
investors who deliberately and knowingly choose the "wrong" investment? 
This rationality problem seems to lie not in the assumption of individuals 
always acting rationally, but rather in how the meaning of rationality has been 
interpreted and used in financial modelling. Rationality, in the context of economics, 
refers to individuals' ability to maximise utility and minimise cost, using information 
at hand. Knowing that some socially responsible investors are consciously choosing 
investment alternatives that may not be expected to be dominant as per the mean­
variance criterion suggests that we may have to accept that return and risk are not 
always the only sources of utility and disutility. 
Behavioural Finance 
In observing human behaviour we are forced to accept that man's sources of 
utility and disutility are many, intricate, and often contradictory to normative theory. 
For instance, there are gamblers, there are people who knowingly lose out on 
liquidity and interest on saved funds by placing it in Christmas clubs, and there are, 
of course, socially responsible investors (Clark-Murphy, 2000). These phenomena 
suggest there may be other sources of utility and disutility than merely financial 
return and risk. Behavioural finance theory has been developed aiming to explain 
such phenomena. 
8 In Markowitz's own (1976) review of the development of investor behaviour he asks the question 
himself: "Are risk and (expected) return adequate measures of a portfolio' s utility to its owner?". In 
order to calculate the combination of risk and return that maximises the investor' s utility the investor's  
utility function must be known. This is, however, a complicated matter since utility functions are 
complicated in themselves and will be different amongst investors. The mean-variance model 
therefore provides a good approximation of how investors may maximise their expected utility, and all 
individuals share this aim, whether or not they are able to calculate this expected outcome themselves. 
Markowitz ( 1976) thereby allows for individuals' constraints in terms of being able to process all the 
information needed to strictly maximise their utility. He does, however, still assume financial risk and 
return are the only sources of utility and disutility. 
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-Behavioural finance aims to replace the behaviourally incomplete theory of 
finance, by focussing on the application of psychological decision processes and 
economic principles whilst recognising that the existing paradigm can be true within 
specific boundaries. Behavioural finance does therefore not reject economic concepts 
and principles that are sound (Olsen, 1998). 
How do SRis fit into finance theory 
Socially responsible investors may extract what may be called "extra­
financial" utility, or the difference between total utility and utility derived from 
financial return, from knowing that their investments are supporting activities they 
regard as beneficial for the environment and society, and/or knowing that their 
investments do not support activities they regard as damaging to the environment and 
society. When these additional sources of utility are taken into account, this will 
change the locus of the optimal utility-disutility efficient investment choice 
compared to when these extra sources of utility are not included. 
Beal and Goyen ( 1998) investigate environmental investor motivations and 
argue that the fundamental view must fail if investors do not perceive SRI and 
donations as close substitutes and are willing to forgo wealth when investing 
ethically. They suggest that traditional theory will only be a partial explanation of 
investor behaviour if environmental investors have objectives other than (or in 
addition to) wealth maximisation while mainstream investors focus on wealth 
maximisation. Beal and Goyen ( 1998) suggest that such a finding would have 
implications for firms' capital budgeting processes, security valuation and portfolio 
composition, as these activities are founded on the wealth maximisation principle. 
A recent survey on Australian shareholder attitudes suggests shareholders are 
less concerned about profit maximisation and more concerned about environmental 
and social responsibility than what has traditionally been assumed (Wade, 200 1)  9• 
9 This survey, as a part of The Shareholder Project sponsored by a large coalition of philanthropic and 
business groups, surveyed 1 000 Australian shareholders about their attitudes towards corporate 
behaviour. They found that, in general, the top priority for the company should be: making money for 
shareholders (29% ); being fair to employees (28% ); protecting the environment ( 1 6% ); and 
contributing to the community well-being (20%). Making money for shareholders was reported to be 
the least popular priority among the 1 8-24 age group. 70% of the surveyed shareholders thought 
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The study of motivations behind socially responsible investing may provide 
answers to the question of whether, and to what extent, these investors are willing to 
forgo returns in return for investing responsibly. This, however, is an issue only if 
SRis are imperfect substitutes for non-SRis from a financial asset perspective. We 
know that these are not perfect substitutes for investors who extract "extra-financial" 
utility from being able to invest responsibly but we don't seem to have much 
evidence on whether they are substitutes from a financial asset perspective. 
2.1.2 SR/s and CSR - The individual firms ' perspective 
The driving forces behind the SRI industry are arguably closely related to the 
driving forces behind Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). These issues have 
arisen from investors and consumers taking an active interest in where their dollar 
spent or invested is going. Consumer activism and investor activism thereby link SRI 
and CSR. 
Post, Frederick, Lawrence and Weber (1996 p. 677) define CSR as "The idea 
that businesses are accountable for the effects of their actions and should seek 
socially beneficial results". 
It is suggested that we should distinguish between two ways in which 
companies may be socially responsible, namely social responsibility in business 
practice and social responsibility in terms of goods and services provided (Tippet, 
200 1). A company that employs superior business practices based on social and 
environmental criteria, and thus qualifies for the CSR title, may still produce 
products and services that do not conform with investor values, and vice versa. 
Hence, the CSR title should not automatically imply inclusion into SRI portfolios. 
companies usually act in their own interest or the interests of big shareholders. 80% of respondents 
said they would be prepared to accept a lower dividend or share price in return for being able to invest 
ethically, although only 20 percent of these reported having made ethical investments (Wade, 200 1 ). 
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--Theories on whether SRis differ from other investments as financial assets 
Whether SRis ( assuming that companies adopting CSR are included into this 
category) carry different risks and returns to non-SRls has been widely discussed 
from a theoretical viewpoint. Anderson (2000) discusses how SRls may differ from 
other investments in terms of investment risk. Investment risk, in regards to 
individual SRis, would be related to the specific asset classes under which these 
investments could be classified. For instance, if SRis can be classified as growth­
stocks more so than value-stocks, as is frequently suggested (see, for instance, Kurtz, 
1997), they should then have risks comparable to growth-stocks in general. Anderson 
also suggests that socially responsible firms are less likely to have their share prices 
affected by environmental remediation ( or clean up), litigation and compensation 
payments, and therefore may be more viable in the long term. 
So are SRis undervalued investments? If the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
holds in its semi-strong form, then potential gains or losses implied by any publicly 
available information on a firm's business activities, including the impact on social 
wellbeing and the environment from its operations, should at all times be reflected in 
the share price (Bodie et al. , 1999) 10. 
Gottsman and Kessler ( 1998) present two opposing theories of how a firm's 
market performance is affected by its environmental performance. They suggest a 
positive proposition, or the green dividend hypothesis, which holds that "good 
environmental performance is coincident with factors that produce good market 
performance (for example, good management generally), and that this fact is not 
adequately recognised by capital markets. The stock of environmentally superior 
firms is underpriced" (Gottsman and Kessler, 1998 p. 15). This proposition would 
therefore imply that such stocks are value rather than growth stocks. 
The negative proposition, or the green penalty hypothesis, holds that 
"superior environmental performance is a drag on stock market performance because 
10 The weak-form EMH holds that "stock prices already reflect all information contained in the history 
of past prices", the semi-strong form EMH holds that "stock prices already reflect all publicly 
available information" and the strong-form EMH holds that "stock prices reflect all relevant 
information including insider information" (Bodie et al., 1999 p. 933). 
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investments in pollution control could be more profitably allocated elsewhere" 
(Gottsman and Kessler, 1998 p. 15). 
How does investment screening affect firms' cost of capital? 
If investors prefer some investments to others based on criteria other than 
firm-specific fundamental financial risk and return, then this should have some effect 
on firms' cost of capital. Merton (1987) presents a model where the cost of capital 
for a firm depends on the number of investors willing to hold shares in that firm. The 
model is specified 
(2) 
where Ak is the cost of capital for firm k, qk is the fraction of investors willing to hold 
shares in firm k, xk is the weight of the firm in the market portfolio, o is the risk 
aversion parameter for each investor in the model, and ak is the variance of the firm's 
return due to firm-specific rather than market factors. This model shows that when 
the fraction of investors willing to hold shares in a firm decreases this has an 
increasing effect on the cost of capital. 
Angel and Rivoli ( 1997) discuss the effect on the firm of ethical screens using 
this model and discuss the impact of a large change in the proportion of investors 
willing to hold shares in a firm. They refer to the basic dividend growth model for a 
firm, where the firm's share price Po is determined by the expected dividend D1 , the 
required rate of return r, and the dividend's constant perpetual growth rate g. 
Po = D1 
(r-g) 
(3) 
When the cost of equity increases significantly, this affects the required rate 
of return positively (i.e. the required rate of return will increase) ceteris paribus, and 
thus the price of the share will decrease. 
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Angel and Rivoli (1997) argue that unless a substantial fraction of the capital 
market boycotts a firm, the increase in the cost of capital is likely to be small. They 
also suggest that whilst a small change in the cost of capital may be negligible at a 
particular point in time, the cumulative costs may become significant. Their findings 
show that the effect of changes in investors' willingness to own stocks in a firm on 
the firm's cost of capital is not uniform across firms. They find that for large, fast­
growing, riskier firms (where the cost of capital is likely to already be relatively 
high) avoided by a large proportion of investors, the effects may be significant, 
whereas such effects may be negligible for other firms. They conclude therefore that 
investor behaviour will only affect certain firms, and that investors therefore should 
be selective when wishing to influence firms through screening practices. 
Feldman, Soyka and Ameer (1997) investigate whether superior 
environmental performance results in a higher stock price (the results of their 
empirical research is discussed in section 2.2.1) and present a visual model 
displaying how environmental management and performance may affect firm value. 
The model is reproduced below. 
Environmental 
Management • 
System 
Environmental Firm � Firm 
Signaling � Risk Value 
Environmental 
Performance • 
Figure 1: The ways in which environmental responsibility may impact on firm 
value 
(Source: Feldman, Soyka and Ameer, 1997 p. 89) 
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2.1.3 SRI funds and portfolio theory 
Portfolio theory distinguishes between two main types of risk, namely market 
risk and unique risk. Market risk is also referred to as nondiversifiable or systematic 
risk, and represents risk that cannot be affected by portfolio diversification. Unique 
risk, also referred to as diversifiable, firm-specific and non-systematic risk, 
represents risk that can be affected by portfolio diversification (Bodie, Kane and 
Marcus, 1999). The market portfolio, which includes all investable assets (or every 
asset in the investable universe), thus represents a perfectly diversified portfolio 
where all diversifiable risk is minimised. In reality, the perfectly diversified portfolio 
is not attainable (because all investable assets must be included), but a portfolio 
manager can minimise the diversifiable risk of a portfolio by maximising its 
diversification given his or her constraints. 
Portfolio theory asserts that fund managers should consider minimising 
portfolio risk by diversifying the portfolio holdings. If SRI portfolios are less 
adequately diversified than non-SRI portfolios this would imply that SRI portfolios 
incur a higher diversifiable risk. Adequate portfolio diversification does, however, 
not only refer to the number of securities included in the portfolio, but also the 
diversification of these securities across industry sectors or asset classes where 
returns tend to be highly correlated (Markowitz, 1976). Fund managers should 
therefore minimise diversifiable risk by taking into account the return covariances of 
the included securities. If SRI portfolios are more heavily weighted in industry 
sectors or asset classes with highly correlated returns than are non-SRI portfolios, 
implying higher covariance of the security returns, then the SRI portfolio would 
incur a higher diversifiable risk. 
So do SRI portfolios minimise diversifiable risk? The answer would arguably 
depend on the investment strategies employed by the individual SRI fund manager. 
Unless all SRis have highly correlated returns, a fund manager should be able to 
minimise risk by including SRls with lowly correlated returns. Even if SRis 
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---consistently have higher unique risk than other investments, this is not an issue 
unless SRI returns seem to be highly correlated with each other as well. 
SRI funds that use positive and/or negative screens may be exposed to more 
diversifiable risk if they are over- or under-exposed to types of investments that tend 
to have highly correlated returns. If, for instance, the tobacco-industry tends to have 
returns that are negatively correlated with other industries a negative tobacco screen 
will then exclude returns that would hedge for the variance in returns in the other 
industries. This also applies to over- or under-exposures to asset classes such as 
growth, value, small and large stocks. 
Gottsman and Kessler ( 1998) discuss these issues, with specific focus on 
environmental screens, and argue that screens do result in over and under-exposures 
to sectors and asset classes. They suggest that "An environmental screen, like any 
other screen, will affect sector balance, total market capitalisation, and other factors 
that can influence returns. But these effects can be corrected in the design of the 
screened set without affecting its environmental performance profile" (Gottsman and 
Kessler, 1998 p. 23). 
Another issue in this context stems from Tippet's (2001 ) suggestion regarding 
the two different issues about which ethical investors are concerned, as discussed in 
part 2.1.2. Tippet (2001) argues that funds basing their selection criteria on the 
products and services produced typically in effect exclude whole industries, which 
may represent important sources of return, and will therefore incur a financial cost to 
the fund members. This is in accordance with the "lack-of-diversification" criticism 
so many are using when discussing SRI fund management. But what if companies 
are evaluated on their social and environmental responsibility in business practices? 
If the firms adopting such practices appear to be spread fairly evenly across 
industries, then this is a type of selection criteria that will arguably not incur such a 
diversification cost on fund returns. This seems to be the main argument for adopting 
the Best-of-Sector selection approach. 
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Teper ( 1992) propose five primary reasons why socially responsible 
portfolios may ha¥e lower risk-adjusted returns than unrestricted portfolios, 
capturing the main sources of criticism against SRI: 
1 .  Lower security returns - if better performers are on a restricted list and 
poorer performers are either overweighted or subsequently added to the 
portfolio. 
2. Higher security risk - if large companies are replaced by smaller more 
volatile companies. 
3. Lower portfolio diversification - if the criteria force the portfolio to be 
underweighted in major industries or sectors. 
4. Divestment transaction cost - the one-time cost of eliminating 
nonqualifying stocks and adding or reweighting others. 
5. Opportunity cost of eliminating an asset class - for example, not investing 
in international equities because it may be too difficult to monitor social 
responsibility. 
This broadly summarises the issues discussed in this section of the literature 
review. The next section of the literature review will review empirical research 
aimed at investigating whether empirical work support these theories. 
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2.2 Empirical studies: The performance of SRis 
2.2.1 Empirical studies on the financial characteristics and relative 
performance of socially responsible firms 
Feldman, Soyka and Ameer ( 1997) claim that evidence suggests the senior 
managers of most American firms subscribe to what Gottsman and Kessler ( 1998) 
refer to as the green penalty hypothesis, rather than the green dividend hypothesis 1 1 • 
Feldman et al. ( 1997) investigate which of these hypotheses is best supported 
by empirical evidence. They survey what they deem to be a large and representative 
sample of the most prominent listed U.S. companies over the time period from 1980 
to 1994, and find that adopting environmental responsibility has a favourable and 
significant impact on investors' perceived riskiness of the firm, the cost of capital as 
well as the firm's market value. Indeed, they suggest that improved environmental 
management and performance can increase market value by as much as 5%. These 
5% can represent substantial amounts. They do emphasise that this estimate is 
illustrative rather than definitive, and that the impact of improved environmental 
performance and management will depend on what activities are actually performed 
and on the amount, distribution and timing of such investment. Naturally, investors' 
level of education and interest in regards to firms' environmental performance will 
be an important factor, as market value is determined by investors' perceptions of the 
future performance of the firm. Also, the comprehensiveness and quality of the 
information infrastructure for communicating such information to investors will 
contribute to this effect. 
When performing a similar study over the time period from 1992 to 1997 
Gottsman and Kessler ( 1998) find that both returns and variability of returns seem to 
be statistically unrelated to environmental and social performance 1 2• This means that 
portfolios excluding companies with poor environmental and social performance will 
1 1  These hypotheses are discussed under "Theories on whether SRis differ from other investments as 
financial assets" in part 2. 1 .2. 
1 2  The analysis is performed on construced portfolios comparing the best 25%, 50% and 75% of 
companies in terms of social and environmental performance to the worst 75%, 50% and 25% of 
companies, respectively. 
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----not perform worse than portfolios constructed from the unrestricted universe. The 
conflicting results may have arisen from the different time periods over which the 
studies were performed. 
McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis ( 1988) investigate whether socially 
responsible firms tend to have different fundamental characteristics. When 
comparing socially responsible firms to other firms they found that socially 
responsible firms have significantly lower debt-to-equity ratios, significantly higher 
return-on-assets ratios, and significantly lower standard deviations of total return 1 3. 
Waddock and Graves (2000) perform a similar study using companies 
included in the Domini 400 Social Index and the S&P 500 Index. They find the only 
statistically significant difference (at 95% confidence) in sales, where the socially 
responsible companies in the sample gave lower average total sales than the S&P 500 
companies. The two groups were found to be statistically indistinguishable for all the 
other measures. 
If Feldman et al. ( 1997) are correct in their assumptions, and having 
accounted for the factors affecting the impact on the share price of environmental 
improvement in production and management, how does this seem to correspond to 
the Australian market? As discussed in section 1.2.5 the Australian market seems to 
be lagging behind the U.S. and European markets in terms of the level of awareness 
of environmental issues, as well as other SRI issues. In terms of the 
comprehensiveness and quality of the information infrastructure for communicating 
information on firms' environmental and social performance, this infrastructure is 
not yet as well developed in Australia as in the US and Europe (The Allen Group, 
2000). It seems therefore plausible to assume that if, as the Feldmal et al. ( 1997) 
study suggests, environmental improvement has a positive effect on the share price, 
then this effect is likely to be of a somewhat lesser magnitude for Australian firms 
than for U.S. and European firms. 
13 Note if socially responsible companies have consistently different style-characteristics than other 
firms, it is possible that such differences could partly explain these findings. 
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The Allen Group (2000) suggest that the influence of socially responsible 
investing on the performance of companies is unclear in this early stage of the 
evolution of the industry. They also emphasise that "the same community 
expectations that are driving socially responsible investing are driving companies to 
reconsider their impact on the environment and the community" (The Allen Group, 
2000 p. 16). 
2.2.2 Studies on the relative performance of typically excluded or included 
stocks 
Besides looking at the effect on share prices of environmental and social 
improvement, empirical research has also been conducted investigating the relative 
performance of typically included and excluded industry sectors. Because the 
tobacco screen is the most widely used negative screen in many markets the tobacco 
industry seems the natural starting point for this type of research. 
Kahn, Lekander and Leimkuhler ( 1997) investigate the relative performance 
of large capitalisation U.S. companies with tobacco operations in the time period 
from 1987 to 1996. They compare the S&P500 portfolio with an S&P500 ex-tobacco 
portfolio and find that tobacco stocks have performed impressively during this time­
frame. They do, however, argue that these stocks are highly uncertain, and that their 
returns may be expected to fall due to the divestiture by large scale investors. 
Kahn et al. (1997) suggest that the increased diversifiable risk that results 
from excluding tobacco stocks from a portfolio may be compensated for by an equal 
portfolio weighting in another industry with which the correlation of returns is high. 
The three highest correlations to the tobacco industry, in the US, are found in the 
agriculture and food industry, the home products industry and the leisure industry 
( correlation coefficients for these industries range from 0.5 17 to 0.582). 
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To investigate how this discussion relates to the Australian market, the total 
reinvested returns from the Australian alcohol and tobacco industry, which should 
represent a typically excluded industry in an SRI portfolio, is compared to the ASX 
All Ordinaries Index in figure 2 1 4. 
The diagram shows that the Australian alcohol and tobacco industry under­
performed compared to the All Ordinaries for most of the period (June 1992 to 
August 2001) with a slight relative over-performance during the 1999 period and 
towards the end of the period. This seems to suggest that Australian SRI funds 
excluding alcohol and tobacco stocks may have gained compared to funds including 
such stocks depending on the time period. 
A correlation matrix for the Australian ASX sub-indices is provided in part 
7 .3.3 of the appendices. The banking sector represent the industry most closely 
related to the alcohol and tobacco industry in Australia, from a financial assets 
perspective, with a correlation of just over 52%. If Australian SRI fund managers 
were to employ the strategy suggested by Kahn et al. ( 1997), whereby the omitted 
industry weighting is compensated for by an equal weighting in an industry with 
closely correlated returns, the banking industry would arguably be the relevant 
industry (provided, of course, Australian banks are accepted as socially responsible 
investments). 
Teper ( 1992) broadens the "sin-stock" debate further and investigates returns on U.S. 
"sin-stocks" by comparing these to the S&P 500 index during the time period from 
1979 to 1989, in order to provide an indication of how exclusion of such stocks may 
affect a portfolio. Three "sin-industries" are selected, namely alcohol, gambling and 
tobacco stocks, major defense contractor stocks, and birth control manufacturer 
stocks 1 5 . He finds that the annualised differences in returns for these industries, 
compared to returns of the S&P 500 index, are + 10.8% for alcohol, manufacturer 
14 Total return indices for this industry and for the whole market (including the tobacco and alcohol 
i ndustry) have been constructed based on the ASX Alcohol & Tobacco Total Return Index and the 
ASX All Ordinaries Total Return Index from start, June 1 992, until August 200 1 .  
1 5  Birth control manufacturer stocks are typically excluded for religious reasons. These screens would 
be more predominantly used in church trusts and other religion-related funds than ordinary retail SRI 
funds. This is at least the case in Australia. 
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stocks. The high over-performance of tobacco, gaming and alcohol stocks 
corresponds well with the findings of Kahn et al. ( 1997) discussed earlier in this 
section. Australian tobacco and alcohol stocks, as argued above, does not seem to 
share this experience 1 6 . 
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Figure 2 - The relative performance of the Australian alcohol and tobacco industry 
Source: Total return series provided by Datastream. 
Teper ( 1992) constructs restricted and unrestricted portfolios, and compares 
the returns from these over the time period from 1984 to 1990. He finds that social 
restrictions consistently imply a cost of around 1.1 % annually, risk adjusted. He also 
investigates whether active management can compensate for the potential losses in 
16  The Australian gambling stocks do not represent a significant proportion of the market, so there is 
little reason to suspect these stock would change what is already assumed about the performance 
alcohol, tobacco and gaming stocks category. That said, the ASX tobacco and alcohol index only 
includes IO stocks. Australian gambling stocks are listed under the ASX tourism index, where 
Burs wood Casino, Casino Australia and TAB are listed. 
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excluding profitable "sin-stocks", and finds that this does not seem to be the case. He 
compares passively managed funds to actively managed funds and finds that active 
management does not seem to have eliminated this cost. He concludes that while an 
annual cost of 1 % may seem fairly small this cost accumulates quickly, and that 
socially responsible investors must be aware of this. He suggest that this cost may 
decrease in the future as more companies become socially responsible and active 
managers attempt to compensate for this cost, but that the industry must accept that 
SRI funds have incurred a cost to their investors thus far. 
The findings of Gottsman and Kessler ( 1998) contradict these findings. They 
construct portfolios with environmental and social screens and compare their returns 
with unscreened portfolios over the time period from 1992 to 1997, and find that 
excluding companies from investment portfolios using these screens has no 
significant effect on returns or on risk adjusted returns, in either a positive or a 
negative direction. The differing results may stem from differing time periods over 
which the studies were conducted. 
Guerard ( 1997) produces yet another result in his study conducted over the 
time period from 1992 to 1997. He also investigates the impact of different 
commonly used screens on portfolio returns and finds that the use of environmental; 
alcohol, tobacco and gaming; military; and nuclear screens produce higher returns 
than those from unscreened portfolios, and that the only screen imposing a cost to the 
returns is the military screen. Comparing this to Teper ( 1992) and Gottman and 
Kessler's ( 1998) results, we may be forced to conclude that the effect of different 
screens on portfolio performance is unequivocal and may be sensitive to the research 
methodologies and time frame of the studies. 
2.2.3 Empirical studies on SRI funds 
So far, we have discussed how corporate social responsibility relates to SRis, 
how exclusion of certain sectors (in particular the tobacco sector) may affect the SRI 
portfolio, and how we should expect, from theoretical viewpoints, SRis to behave in 
the market place. Artificially constructed screened funds have also been evaluated in 
the search for better insight of what socially responsible investors may expect from 
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---their fund managers. But how do they really behave? Empirical studies on SRis have 
been limited but increasing, both overseas and in Australia. 
Guerard ( 1997) finds that returns of U.S. socially screened funds do not differ 
significantly to the unscreened universe in the 1987- 1996 period. Guerard also 
provides some research on the investment style and finds that larger, more value­
oriented stocks typically are excluded from screened funds. The latter supports the 
commonly stated assumption of SRis being growth rather than value stocks (see, for 
instance, Kurtz, 1997). John Ilkiw, global consulting practices director at Frank 
Russel Co., Tacoma, is reported to have said, in an interview with Pensions & 
Investments, that screening out "sin-stocks" has no significant impact on investment 
performance compared to non-screened portfolios (Payne, 2001). 
Wollenberg (2001) reports that of 48 SRI funds with at least a 3-year 
performance history, seven (15%) earned five stars and 12 earned four stars from 
Morningstar, which rates the mutual fund industry by performance. According to 
Wollenberg, only 10% of all mutual funds get the five-star rating, suggesting SRI 
funds may be better performers on average. This evidence is, however, rather weak. 
Evidence from Australian SRI funds 
Cummings (2000) investigates the performance of a sample of Australian 
screened funds by use of a three-factor Jensen measure where an industry factor, a 
smaller company factor and a market factor is included. The industry factor, 
determined by the type of unit trust, is proxied by the funds' respective Industrial 
Indices, which are grouped along five categories. These categories are: 
1. Managed Funds Growth, 
2. Australian Equities Growth, 
3. Managed Bonds Growth, 
4. Managed Superannuation Growth, 
5. Managed Deferred Annuities - Growth. 
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An index of all companies listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX), 
excluding the top 100 companies by market capitalisation is used as a proxy for the 
smaller companies factor, and the ASX All Ordinaries Accumulation Index is used as 
a proxy for the market factor. 
The R-squares (measuring what proportion of the variations in fund returns is 
explained by the model) are relatively low, ranging from 0. 138 to 0.743, and the 
resulting Jensen alphas are insignificantly different from zero (both at a 5% and a 
10% level). 
In order to test for the differences in ethical trust returns compared to the 
respective Industrial Indices, the smaller companies index and the market index, a 
single-factor Jensen measure, the Sharpe measure and the Treynor measure is used. 
These measures are more closely explained in section 2.3. The single-factor Jensen 
measure is calculated using the All Ordinaries Index as a proxy for the market factor. 
None of these performance measures suggest any over- or under­
performance when comparing returns to their Industry Indices. Some, however, seem 
to have under-performed when compared to the small company index, but 
Cummings (2000) emphasises that this comparison is made over a relatively short 
time-frame, which may affect the reliability of such a result. He also mentions the 
possible bias that may have been caused by an exceptional perfomiance and growth 
in smaller companies on the Australian share market. Also when comparing the 
ethical trusts to the All Ordinaries Index, Cummings finds that they tend to under­
perform, but these figures are not significantly different from zero . .  
Cummings's (2000) results therefore provide little substantial evidence to 
support the hypothesis that ethical trusts perform differently to the respective 
industry indices, the small companies index, or the market index. 
Tippet (2001) selects three Australian Ethical Funds, namely the Tower Life 
fund, the Tyndall fund and the Australian Ethical fund, and compares these to the 
ASX All Ordinaries Accumulation Index. He finds that one of these, the Australian 
Ethical fund, which also is recognised as the "purest" in terms of selection criteria, 
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gave fairly consistently less than half the returns of the market index. The two others 
did not seem to significantly over or under-perform on average 1 7. None of these 
returns are risk-adjusted, however, and the chosen benchmark may not be as 
representative for evaluating these funds as various comparable managed fund 
indices might have been. 
Tippet (2001) further investigates the performance of the ethical funds 
compared to the performance of the five companies with the highest weightings in 
the respective portfolios, and finds that the fund returns were lower than the 
combined returns of these top five investments. He claims this to support the 
assumption that screening incurs higher transaction and management expenses. 
Tippet (2001) uses a composite portfolio of the three funds, using the fund 
betas, and calculates the expected return in this portfolio using a one-factor Capital 
Asset Pricing Model where the All Ordinaries Accumulation Index represents the 
market factor. The calculated expected return is 10.30% per annum, which is more 
than the actual fund performance. Tippet (2001) therefore concludes that this 
portfolio has incurred a financial cost of 1.59% per annum. He also calculates the 
Treynor measure and the Jensen alpha and concludes from the latter that only the 
Tyndall fund did not experience negative abnormal performance. 
These two studies represent the beginning of a, hopefully, continuing 
evolution of empirical studies of Australian SRI funds. The studies on Australian and 
U.S. SRI funds present a wide range of methodologies for evaluating such funds and 
also a wide range of benchmarks used for evaluating their performance. The results 
are also very varied. 
The present study will hopefully represent a step towards better 
understanding of the SRI fund industry, primarily by investigating the style of 
Australian SRI funds - a type of analysis that has been lacking to date. This seems 
17 The Tyndall fund seems to have annual returns curiously uncorrelated with the market returns. This 
sort of tracking-error may indicate a different investment style, and this fund would be interesting to 
analyse in the style analysis undertaken in this study. The fund is not included in my study because it 
is not listed on the Ethical Investor's list of available ethical funds, which seem to indicate that this 
fund is no longer available. 
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---curious, since so much of the discussion and criticism of SRI funds is based on how 
they are assumed to differ from unscreened funcls with regard to investment style. 
The present study seeks empirical evidence for these commonly stated assumptions 
using a sample of Australian SRI funds. 
The next chapter will review the literature on the fund performance measures 
and style analysis as this is relevant to the methodologies of the present study. 
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3. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ON FUND 
PERFORMANCE MEASURES AND STYLE ANALYSIS 
3.1 Portfolio performance measures 
There are several approaches to evaluating portfolio performance. On a very 
basic level, a portfolio's raw returns may be compared to that of a chosen 
benchmark. The next level of methodology sophistication may imply controlling for 
risk by calculating excess returns of the portfolio and the benchmark. More 
sophisticated performance measures may control for different types of risk and 
market performance. 
Bodie, Kane and Marcus ( 1999) present four portfolio performance measures 
used in the industry. These include Sharpe's measure, Treynor' s  measure, Jensen' s  
measure and the appraisal ratio. As we have seen in  the first part of the literature 
review, Sharpe, Treynor and Jensen's measures have been used by, for instance, 
Cummings (2000) and Tippet (2001) in evaluating portfolio performance. 
Sharpe's measure is a reward-to-variability ratio and divides average portfolio 
excess return over the sample period by the standard deviation of returns over that 
period. It is given by (r P - r f)la P . Treynor' s measure is similar to the Sharpe 
measure, but uses systematic risk instead of total risk. It is given by (r P - r J)l /3 P . In 
these formulae r P represents the portfolio' s average return, r f represents the average 
risk-free rate, a P represents the portfolio standard deviation and /3 P represents the 
portfolio' s  beta relative to the market benchmark (Bodie et al. , 1999). 
Jensen's measure is the average return on the portfolio, exceeding the return 
predicted by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM), given the portfolio' s  beta and 
the average market return. This measure is commonly referred to as the portfolio 
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--alpha, and is given by ap = rp - [ r1 + {3p(rM - r1)] 1 8, where ap represents the 
portfolio alpha and rM represents the average market return. The appraisal ratio 
divides the portfolio alpha by the non-systematic risk of the portfolio and measures 
abnormal return per unit of risk that in principle could be diversified away from 
holding a market index portfolio. It is given by ap I a(ep), where a(ep) represents the 
non-systematic risk (Bodie et al. , 1999). 
The appropriate performance measure for a portfolio depends on the role of 
this portfolio. Bodie et al. ( 1999) assert that Sharpe's measure is appropriate when 
the portfolio represents the entire investment fund, as opposed to the appraisal ratio, 
which is appropriate when the portfolio represents an active portfolio to be optimally 
mixed with a passive portfolio. The Jensen and Treynor' s measures are, however, 
appropriate when the portfolio represents one sub-portfolio of many (Bodie et al., 
1999). 
3.1.1 The Jensen measure 
The Jensen measure may be expanded to control for more factors than just the 
market factor. For instance, Cummings (2000) expands the Jensen measure to 
include three factors, namely a relevant industry factor, determined by the type of 
fund to be evaluated, a small companies factor and a market factor (these are 
discussed in more detail in part 2.2.3). This three-factor model is given 
R11 = al + /31 I R1ndustry.t + /312 Rsmal/Co,t + /3}3 RMarket,t (4) 
where R11 represents excess return on portfolio j, a1 represents the portfolio alpha, 
Rindustry,t represents excess return from the industry index, Rsma11ca.1 represents excess 
return from small companies and RMarket. t represents excess return on the market, at 
1 8  Throughout this paper the model used for calculating the Jensen measure is expressed with the risk­
adjusted portfolio return, rl' - r1 , being the dependant variable, on the left hand side, and with all 
independent variables on the right hand side of the equality sign. 
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period t. 
Drew and Stanford (200 1) use a four-factor model, and include a market 
factor, a size factor, a style factor and a fixed interest factor in their model, so that 
these factors can be controlled for when calculating the alpha. That is, the difference 
in performance between small and large stocks, the difference in performance 
between growth and value stocks, and the risk-premium on fixed-interest securities 
are included as explanatory variables. The model is given 
where Rit represents the return on portfolio i, Rft the risk-free rate of return, Rm1 the 
market return, Rs1 the return on small stocks, R11 the return on large stocks, Rg1 the 
return on growth stocks, Rv1 the return on value stocks and Rdi the return on debt at 
period t. ai represents the portfolio alpha and t:i a random error term. 
The Jensen alpha thus represents a portfolio's risk-adjusted return when the 
returns of the included factors are controlled for. 
3.1.2 Limitations of the Jensen-alpha performance measure 
Tracking error, which is defined as the difference between the returns of the 
fund and the benchmark-returns (Frino and Gallagher, 1996), is typically an issue 
when evaluating fund performance. Because funds typically are evaluated using a 
passive index, such as the ASX All Ordinaries Accumulation Index in Australia, 
tracking error results from these benchmarks not taking account of costs that, 
ultimately, are incurred to fund members through management fees and other 
managed fund-related costs. Frino and Gallagher ( 1996) list possible sources of 
tracking error, including transaction costs, index composition changes, corporate 
activity, cash flows, index volatility, and reinvestment of dividends, and find in their 
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study that cash flows, market bid-ask spreads and index volatility are significant 
determinants of tracking error for Australian funds 1 9 . 
It is important to use an appropriate benchmark with which the fund 
performance is compared, regardless of what performance measure is used. The 
performance measure is thus calculated for the fund in question and for the 
benchmark, and these measures are compared in order to evaluate the fund's 
performance relative to the benchmark. 
The present study uses a four-factor alpha model similar to that presented by 
Drew and Stanford (2001) when evaluating relative performance of Australian SRI 
funds. 
3.2 Style analysis 
3.2.1 About style analysis 
Investment style typically refers to investment attributes that are 
distinguishable in terms of fundamental financial measures. Two commonly used 
style-measures include the market capitalisation (or size) of a firm and the firm's 
book-to-market ratio (indicating growth or value attributes). Asset classes thus 
typically distinguish between for example small, medium and large capitalisation 
stocks, growth and value stocks, domestic and international securities, cash 
equivalents and bonds. The terminology is commonly used in the context of managed 
funds in order to classify funds by their investment style, that is - how the fund 
holdings are spread across asset classes. 
19 Roll's ( l  992) critique of the practice of fund managers trying to produce a more efficient managed 
portfolio by minimising the volatility of tracking error is not as relevant in this context as in other 
situations. Roll' s argument holds that the market portfolio is not mean-variance efficient, that other 
attainable portfolios exist that are more mean-variance efficient and that fund managers therefore do 
not optimise their portfolios by matching the benchmark. 
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Lucas and Riepe ( 1996 p. 4) define returns-based style analysis as "a 
statistical technique that identifies what combinations of long positions in passive 
indices would have most closely replicated the actual performance of a fund over a 
specified time period". Returns based style analysis is largely attributed to Sharpe 
( 1992). 
Sharpe ( 1992), Lucas and Riepe ( 1996), Buetow, Johnson and Runkle (2000) 
and Groenewoller, McLeod and Rose (200 1)  use returns based style analysis to 
investigate fund styles, and include factors such as returns on small, medium and 
large capitalisation stocks, growth and value stocks, bonds and international equity in 
their models. Style analysis can, however, be used to investigate portfolio weightings 
across other categories, provided the factors used are mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive and that the factors have different returns, i.e. the correlations between 
them must not be too high 20. Style can therefore also be used as a term where stocks 
are grouped by industry. Buetow et al. (200 1) include some industry sectors in their 
list of possible factors to be included in style analysis. 
One objective of applying style analysis to funds is the possibility of being 
able to predict returns based on what we know about the weightings of asset classes 
within that fund (Lucas and Riepe, 1996). The analyst's ability to do this is, of 
course, dependent on the stability of the fund's asset allocation. A fund manager who 
over time alters the fund holdings only within asset classes, holding the weightings 
constant, should theoretically incur less returns-variability than a fund manager who 
.changes the weightings during the time period in question. 
It follows from this that fund managers should aim to keep asset allocations 
fairly constant over time. Provided that a given asset allocation implies a calculable 
expected return (and possibly risk) it must therefore also be possible to design a style 
(that is, asset allocation) to match a desired combination of asset-class related risk 
(or risk by exposure) and expected return. 
20 According to Sharpe ( 1992) these requirements are desirable, but not strictly necessary. 
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From the investor's perspective, he or she may seek a certain exposure to a 
certain asset class. If, for instance, an investor wants 25% exposure to international 
equity, then he or she could simply chose the fund whose disclosed information on 
asset allocation matches this proportion. Asset allocation is, however, not easy to 
obtain at frequent intervals, and may not always reflect the true average fund asset 
allocation over time or how the fund is exposed to movements in different markets. 
The investor's objective is, ultimately, to have a portfolio return that is "25% 
dependent on" movements in the international equity market - regardless of what the 
actual asset allocation is. An investor who wishes to allocate 25% of his or her 
portfolio to international equities can therefore select a fund where the sensitivity to 
movements in this asset class matches 25%, indicating that the fund, at least, behaves 
as if it has this weighting in international equity (Lucas and Riepe, 1996). 
Lucas and Riepe (1996) argue that that a fund's asset allocation may not be 
perfectly reflected in its returns. For example, because many domestic companies 
trade with foreign companies they may be highly exposed to movements in the 
international economy, their returns would be affected by such movements. Thus 
style analysis reveal a fund's real exposure is to style-factors, for which disclosed 
asset allocations may be an inadequate measure. Lucas and Riepe also suggest that 
using style analysis significantly improves the R-squared values when explaining 
returns on funds ( compared to using benchmarks). 
Another objective of using style analysis arises from the availability and 
quality of disclosed fund asset allocation. Some managers do not readily provide 
such information, and those who do may not necessarily disclose the funds' long-run 
average pattern of asset allocation, and may even manipulate holdings for the time 
where the asset allocation is disclosed so as to match set targets. Style analysis 
provides a solution to such problems by revealing the funds' real average exposures 
to asset classes, using readily available passive indices and fund returns. 
Thus, style analysis will not necessarily reflect the true asset allocation of a 
fund. Fund managers may or may not give accurate information on their funds' asset 
allocation, and asset allocation may also vary over time, but a style analysis such as 
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that presented here gives an indication of how the changes in return have matched 
return on the different factor proxies over a period of time, on average. 
Model specification 
The basic model used for style analysis, as presented by Sharpe ( 1992), is 
given by 
(6) 
where Ri represents the return on fund i, F1 represents the value of factor 1, F2 
represents the value of factor 2, F0 represents the value of the nth factor, and ei 
represents the "non-factor" component of the return on fund i. The values of bn , bi2 , 
and bin represents the sensitivities of Ri to factors F1 , F2 and F0• The components 
inside the brackets are those indicating the style of the fund, whereas the residual will 
reflect the proportion of fund return caused by selection. The residuals are assumed 
to have a mean of zero and be uncorrelated with the independent variables. 
By regressing the fund return series on a chosen set of factors, using 
appropriate proxies, the sensitivities of the fund returns to each of the factors are 
generated. These computed sensitivities, or betas, will indicate what proportion of 
the variability in fund returns matches the returns from the different factor proxies, 
thus indicating how the fund is exposed to these factors 2 1 • The computed R-squared 
values for the model indicate the "goodness of fit" of the model, that is - the extent 
to which the explanatory variables explain the variation in fund returns. 
The number of factors included in the model will affect the "quality" of the 
computed betas. An under-specified model will not be very useful as important 
sources of returns may be left out, and a model with too many factors is very likely 
to suffer from multicollinearity, in which case the individual beta values are likely to 
be small and insignificant and unreliable as indicators of sensitivity of returns to the 
specific factors. Multicollinearity is typically indicated by high R-squared values and 
simultaneously small and insignificant betas when applying Ordinary Least Squares 
21 Note that such analysis will merely look at how the fund is behaving in the market, and the result 
will inform that the firm is behaving as if the fund is exposed to the factors as implied by the betas. 
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(OLS) (Pindyck and Rubinfeld, 1998). Highly correlated returns of the factors 
included in the model can also indicate multicollinearity. This problem iS difficult to 
rectify, but calculating bilateral correlations between all factors included in a model 
may provide an indication of where in the model multicollinearity is most likely to 
be present. Sharpe ( 1992) asserts that even if the R-squared values for the model 
remain unchanged, a model with fewer factors is more likely to represent "continuing 
fundamental relationships with predictive content" (Sharpe, 1992 p. 8). 
The models used in asset class style analysis differ in terms of included 
factors, but they usually include capitalisation, value/growth, fixed interest, cash, and 
international assets as a minimum. As already discussed, model specification affects 
the reliability of estimated parameters and thus the usefulness of the model. As many 
sources of returns-variability as possible should be included to account for 
exposures. However, the nature of these factors (representing tradable assets) 
typically implies a high probability of linear relationships existing amongst them (i.e. 
multicollinearity), which again implies unreliable estimates. 
Others employing style analysis have specified their models to varying sizes 
and degrees of specificity. Groenewoller et al. (2001) use a comparatively small 
nine-factor model when analysing New Zealand investment funds. Lucas and Riepe 
( 1996) also use a nine-factor model, but use different factors. Sharpe ( 1992) includes 
12 factors in his example. Buetow et al. (2001) suggest an extensive list of 27 
possible factors, but keep the number of factors included in their empirical analysis 
down to 12. Groenewoller et al. (2001) include mid-cap growth and value, large-cap, 
small-cap, international bonds, international stocks, and New Zealand listed property. 
The latter inclusion suggests relaxation of the requirement of factors being mutually 
exclusive (as listed property typically is included in the other equity indices). Lucas 
and Riepe ( 1996) include large-cap value, large-cap growth, small-cap value, small­
cap growth, international bonds, long-term bonds, intermediate-term bonds, 
international stocks, and cash. Sharpe ( 1992) includes large-cap value, large-cap 
growth, medium-cap, small-cap, bills (i.e. cash-equivalents), long-term government 
bonds, intermediate-term government bonds, mortgage-related securities, non-U.S. 
bonds, European stocks and Japanese stocks. Buetow et al. (2001) suggest, apart 
form the usual factors (value, growth, etc.), inclusion of different types of bonds, 
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different categories of growth and value stocks, geographically specific international 
stocks, and also industry sectors. 
Estimation 
The aim of style analysis is to pick the set of betas which best explain asset 
class exposures over time. This set of exposures is the one for which the variance of 
the residuals is the least, whereas in an OLS estimation the aim is to pick the set of 
betas for which the sum of the squared residuals is the smallest. Two extra 
restrictions are to be placed on the regression. Firstly, the betas cannot be negative, 
and secondly, the sum of the betas must sum to unity. The betas cannot be negative 
because we assume no negative (or short) holdings in any asset classes or industry 
sectors, and they must sum to unity because the weightings in the portfolio are 
proportions out of 100% 22• Placing these restrictions on the regression will result in 
slightly lower R-squared values compared to those obtained using an unrestricted 
regression (Sharpe, 1992). 
3.2.2 Does style matter? 
Style analysis would only be useful if the investment styles identified reflect 
distinguishable market behaviour, that is - if they differ as financial assets. Indro, 
Jiang, Hu and Lee ( 1998) address the question of whether this is the case. They 
survey a sample of U.S. managed funds between 1993 and 1995, and find that style 
does matter. They find that, on a risk-adjusted return basis, large capitalisation 
growth stock-oriented funds were the worst performing group in the sample, whereas 
medium capitalisation growth and small capitalisation growth stock-oriented funds 
generated the highest returns. The latter funds were, however, much less diversified 
and had higher total risk than other funds with more balanced exposures between 
22 Placing such restriction on a regression requires quadratic programming. This was solved somewhat 
indirectly using a non-linear regression in SPSS with the restrictions. By adding a constraint to the 
model the usual OLS objective is equivalent to the objective of minimisation of the variance of the 
residuals. 
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these asset classes. (This group of funds seems to match the observed descriptions of 
SRI funds.) The large capitalisation value stock-oriented funds attained the lowest 
total risk with no decrease in total return, and appeared to be the most mean-variance 
efficient style-consistent funds. Findings from such analyses may be sensitive to the 
choice of time-frame and market for which an analysis is undertaken. 
As long as style matters to financial performance, style analysis represents a 
useful approach in determining how funds are likely to behave as financial assets. 
3.2.3 How may style analysis contribute to the understanding of SRI funds? 
The strongest argument for screened investment portfolios being inherently 
riskier than un-screened portfolios is the potential for larger diversifiable risk. This is 
because a screened portfolio has a smaller universe than an un-screened portfolio. If 
the screening process excludes investments of equal proportions across all sectors 
and asset classes, the theoretical increase in the risk-level will be limited to merely a 
smaller investable universe. However, screening might involve heavier reductions of 
available investments in some sectors or asset classes relative to others. This will 
result in risk stemming from over and under-exposures to sectors and/or asset 
classes. 
Style analysis may provide some evidence of whether SRI funds are more 
likely to be more heavily exposed to certain asset classes than comparable non-SRI 
funds, such as what has been suggested in the first part of the literature review (see, 
for instance, Kurtz, 1997) . 
3.2.4 Limitations of style analysis 
Style analysis, like any other analytical tool, has its limitations and should 
always be applied with care and always with the objective of the analysis in mind. 
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It is important to acknowledge that the estimated betas are biased because 
they are constrained and are not as reliable for interpretation as they would be using 
an unconstrained regression, even if the R-squared values are high. It is therefore 
difficult to judge statistical significance of the estimates. 
The return series of factors included in style analyses are very likely to be 
relatively highly correlated with each other. Multicollinearity, which is very likely to 
occur when the return series of the included factors are highly correlated, implies that 
the estimated factor betas are less reliable as indicators of factor exposure. 
Buetow et al. (2000) do not stress the implications of multicollinearity in their 
study dedicated to the weaknesses of style analysis, but give emphasis to the problem 
of subjectivity in perceptions and differences in definitions of investment styles. 
They point to several cases where fund managers have been surprised by seeing their 
portfolios classified quite differently to how they are marketed, and conclude that 
differences in definitions of styles is the main source of inconsistency of results and 
that the results may well be very misleading and should not be relied upon. Despite 
their strong criticism of style analysis, Buetow et al. (2000) allow that fund managers 
can construct their own benchmarks matching their own individual perceptions of 
styles. This criticism would not apply to the same extent if the funds under 
investigation and their benchmark indices are using the same definitions of styles. 
Finally, changes in asset classes over time, if they are frequent and 
significant, will disturb the consistency of the style analysis. A set of factor betas 
calculated using style analysis provides an indication of how the changes in return 
have matched return on the different factor proxies over a period of time, on average. 
If the factor exposures change significantly over time this will affect the reliability of 
the estimated betas. A "rolling window" of style exposures is typically used for the 
purpose of investigating the stability of style exposures over time (Sharpe, 1992). 
The next chapter discusses the methodology and analysis of the research 
undertaken in the present study. 
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4. METHODOLOGY AND ANALYSIS OF THE RESEARCH 
UNDERTAKEN 
4.1 The SRI funds and the benchmark indices included in the analysis 
The SRI funds included in the analysis are divided into two main groups, 
namely Australian SRI funds and Australian superannuation SRI funds. These two 
groups are included in the Morningstar Australian Equity Trusts - General sub­
category and the Australian Superannuation Equity - General sub-category, 
respectively. 
The selection of SRI funds to be included in the analysis was limited by the 
number of Australian SRI funds available and how long the funds had been operating 
for. All funds for which returns-series were available for at least two years were 
included amongst those available through Morningstar. Six SRI funds and five 
superannuation SRI funds fulfilled these criteria, although two of the superannuation 
SRI funds, whilst being individual funds, were from the same investment pool and 
· therefore only one of them was included in the sample. 
To ensure consistency in terms of index calculation methodology, the sub­
category indices are also provided by Morningstar. The Morningstar Australian 
Equity Trusts General (MAETG) Index is used as a benchmark for the Australian 
equity SRI fund. This index includes all Australian equity trusts under the general 
category. Also, the Morningstar Superannuation Australian Equity General 
(MSAEG) Index is used as a benchmark for the superannuation Australian equity 
SRI funds. This index includes all Australian Superannuation funds listed under the 
superannuation Australian equity general category 23 . 
23 Please note that Morningstar uses the term "general" as including all funds, superannuation and 
ordinary managed trusts, that are not grouped under any other category (such as SRI funds, which are 
grouped under the miscellaneous category by Morningstar). Throughout this paper I use the term 
"general" when referring to ordinary SRI funds as opposed to superannuation SRI funds. 
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All included indices aim to provide a fair comparison between the funds 
themselves, against other types of investments, against peer group averages and 
against market indices (Morningstar Performance Calculation Methodology -
Technical Bulletin, n.d.). The indices are total return indices, with reinvestment of all 
distributions back into the scheme adjusting for any capital re-organisation. 
Performance measures are based on unit prices and declared rates that are net of all 
ongoing fees assessed against the fund and reflected in the fund unit prices and 
declared rates. Morningstar does not adjust for entry and exit fees. The indices are 
weighted by market capitalisation (Morningstar Performance Calculation 
Methodology - Technical Bulletin, n.d.). 
Table 1 lists the SRI funds included, their start date, and other relevant 
information made available. 
4.2 Preliminary observations 
In order to provide a starting point for the analysis of these funds the average 
monthly raw returns and their variances are provided in Table 2. The average 
monthly returns and their variances were calculated from the total accumulated 
returns, and are provided for the full period since the start of the fund, the last 3-year 
period and the last 2-year period. Table 2 implies a consistent out-performance of the 
Australian Ethical fund, the two Tower SRI funds and the Glebe Blue Chip fund 
compared to the MAETG Index. The Challenger SRI fund and the Glebe Mid Cap 
fund seems almost consistently to have had lower returns than the benchmark index. 
The first of the Tower Super Ethical funds had higher returns than the MSAEG Index 
only for the last 2-year period, but all the other superannuation SRI funds 
consistent! y had higher returns than the benchmark index. 
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Table 1 - Australian SRI funds and benchmark indices included in the study 
Start Date Strategies I 
Ethical Investor 
Corporate Monitor 
SRI Funds Ratings* 
Australian Eq_uil_l_ SRI Funds 
Challenger SRI fund 14 Apr 1 989 Listed ASX securities **** 
Australian Ethical 1 9  Sep 1 994 Australian equities 
Tower Ethical Growth I Dec 1998 *** 
Tower Ethical NEF I Dec 1 998 *** 
Glebe Blue Chip 25 Jul 1 997 Top 100 ASX 
securities *** 
Glebe Mid Cap 25 Jul 1997 ASX securities ranked 
bet ween 50th- l 50th by 
market cap. *** 
Relevant index 
Morningstar Australian Equity Trusts - General (MAETG) 
Australian Superannuation SR! Funds 
Tower Super Ethical 
Group 1 
3 1  Jan 1995 *** 
Tower Managed Super 3 1  Jan 1 995 
Ethical Group 2 
*** 
Australian Ethical 
Super Large 
Australian Ethical 
Super Equities 
Relevant index 
3 1  Dec 1 998 Large stocks 
3 1  Dec 1 998 Small stocks 
Morningstar Superannuation Australian Equity - General 
(MSAEG) 
Asset allocation 
10.9% cash, 0.2% Australian 
Property Securities, 89.0% 
Australian Shares (Morningstar 
2001 )  
60-69% Australian shares, 0-20% 
international listed equities, 0-20% 
unlisted equities and convertible debt, 
5- 1 6% cash (Morningstar, 2001 )  
70-95% Australian shares, 0-25% 
fixed interest securities, 5-30% cash 
(Morningstar 200 I )  
70-95% Australian shares, 0-25% 
fixed interest securities, 5-30% cash 
(Morningstar, 2001 )  
90- 1 00% Australian shares, 0- 1 0% 
cash (Tower Managed Funds, 2001 )  
90- 1 00% Australian shares, 0- 1 0% 
cash (Tower Managed Funds, 200 I )  
49.49% top 1 00  listed equities (by 
market cap), 37 .5% other listed 
equities, 8.64% cash, 4.37% 
Australian properties (Australian 
Ethical Superannuation, 2001 )  
2 1 .35% top 100 listed equities (by 
market cap), 6 1 .  93% other listed 
equities, 1 3 .06% cash, 3.65% unlisted 
equities and convertible debt 
(Australian Ethical Superannuation, 
2001 
* This measure rates how well the funds are specifically designed to meet the needs of ethical investors by 
a number of criteria, including historical performance, corporate resources, transparency in terms of investment 
objectives and ethical policy. One star indicates poor performance, and five stars indicates an "excellent 
investment with excellent ethical merit". 
Sources : Ethical Investment magazine (2001 issue 4, pp 5 1 -58), Morningstar (200 I ), Tower Managed Funds 
(200 I ), Australian Ethical Superannuation (200 I ). 
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Table 2 - Australian SR/funds: Average Monthly Returns and Variances 
Average Monthly Return Variance of Monthly 
Returns 
MAETG Jun92-AugOI 0.007263 0.003334 
Aug98-AugOI 0.009047 0.001011 
Aug99-AugOI 0.006760 0.000783 
Challenger SRI fund Jun92-AugOI 0.007353 0.000555 
Aug98-AugOI 0.005465 0.000780 
Aug99-AugOI 0.00551 3  0.000757 
Australian Ethical Sep94-AugOI 0.01051 3 0.001059 
Aug98-AugOI 0.01 4448 0.0011 58 
Aug99-AugOI 0.014889 0.001278 
Tower Eth. Growth Dec98-Aug0 I 0.009135 0.001423 
Tower Ethical NEF Dec98-Aug0I 0.00851 4 0.001 394 
Glebe Blue Chip Jul97-AugOI 0.008670 0.00 1 053 
Aug98-Aug0I 0.009007 0.000846 
Aug99-Aug0I 0.007988 0.000665 
Glebe Mid Cap Jul97-AugOI 0.004384 0.001708 
Aug98-AugOI 0.007393 0.001465 
Aug99-AugOI 0.002728 0.001538 
MSAEG Jun92-AugOI 0.009009 0.002070 
Aug98-Aug0I 0.008771 0.000788 
Aug99-Aug0I 0.006608 0.000626 
Tower Sup. Eth.I Jan95-AugOI 0.008559 0.001471 
Aug98-AugOI 0.009504 0.000984 
Aug99-Aug0I 0.008842 0.000946 
Tower Sup. Eth.2 Jan95-AugOI 0.01 01 58 0.000940 
Aug98-AugOI 0.008979 0.000979 
Aug99-AugOI 0.008493 0.000946 
Aust. Eth. Sup. Lrg. Dec98-AugOI 0.0 1 4287 0.000938 
Aust. Eth. Sup. Equit. Dec98-AugOI 0.01 3658 0.000870 
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In terms of variability of returns, the average variability of returns for the 
general SRI funds is lower for the full period, higher for the last 3-year period and 
higher also for the last 2-year period compared to the MAETG Index. The 
Challenger SRI fund and the Glebe Blue Chip fund have consistently lower 
variability of returns, whereas the others have higher variability of returns compared 
to the benchmark index. The superannuation SRI funds, on average, have lower 
variability of returns for the full period, higher variability of returns for the last 3-
year period and also for the last 2-year period compared to the MSAEG Index. All 
the superannuation SRI funds tend to have higher variability of returns compared to 
the benchmark index. 
Variability of returns thus tends to be higher for individual SRI funds, both 
general and superannuation, compared to the relevant benchmark indices. One would 
expect, however, that the diversity of a fund index gives a lower variability of returns 
than for individual funds. 
These figures are not very reliable - they are not risk-adjusted, and are not 
tested for statistical significance. These figures are only meant to facilitate a starting 
point and an indication of how the funds behave. More in-depth analysis is provided 
in part 4.3 and 4.4. 
4.3 Assessing fund performance - The Jensen alpha 
4.3. 1 Model specification and data collection 
The basic four-factor model used in this analysis is presented as follows 
where ai = risk-adjusted excess return on fund i; 
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= 
return on fund i in period t; 
the risk-free return in period t; 
the market factor; 
the sensitivity of changes in returns on fund i to the market 
factor ; 
the size factor; 
/3si = the sensitivity of changes in return on fund i to the size factor; 
the style factor; 
{3g i = the sensitivity of changes in returns on fund i to the style 
factor; 
Rd1-R11 = the domestic fixed-interest factor; 
/3di = the sensitivity of changes in returns on fund i to the domestic 
fixed-interest factor; and 
= random error term. 
The explanations of the included factors, and the proxies used for the factors, 
are provided in Table 3 .  The S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries Index includes the top 300 
stocks (S&P/ASX 300) by market capitalisation, except for the top 100 (S&P/ASX 
100). This index therefore includes the 10 1  st through to the 3001h largest stock by 
market capitalisation. This indeJC therefore omits the 301 st through to the smallest 
stock by market capitalisation. The number of omitted stocks vary with the total 
number of companies listed. A total return index for these omitted stocks was 
constructed, using the S&P/ ASX 300 and the ASX All Ordinaries Total Return 
Indices and available yearly figures for the proportions of the S&P/ASX 300 out of 
the ASX All Ordinaries 24. These proportions vary from 9 1.21  % in June 1992 to a 
peak of 96.06% in December 1998, and to 95.21  % in December 1999 (Webb, 
Standard & Poors, personal communication, 6. November 200 1) (newer data was not 
found). The constructed index was named "very small capitalisation". 
24 These proportions are provided in part 7. I of the appendices. 
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Table 3 - Factors included in the Jensen measure and proxies 
Notation Explanation Proxy 
Rt risk-free return Australian 90-day Treasury 
Note 
Rm market factor ASX All Ordinaries 
Accumulation Index 
Rs returns on small capitalisation ASX Small Ordinaries 
stocks Accumulation Index 
Rvs returns on very small ASX smallest 200 accumulation 
capitalisation stocks index (self-constructed) 
R1 returns on large capitalisation ASX top l OO  Accumulation 
stocks Index 
Rg returns on growth stocks MSCI Growth Total Return 
Index Australia 
Rv returns on value stocks MSCI Value Total Return Index 
Australia 
Rd returns on fixed interest UBSW A Composite All 
securities Maturities Bond Total Return 
Index 
Consequently, one model is specified using two different proxies for the 
small capitalisation stocks. The model using the very small capitalisation stock is 
specified with Rvs instead of Rs as the symbol of the returns on the very small 
stocks 25 . 
The returns-series for the factor proxies required for this analysis were 
accessed through Datastream. End-of-the-month data was used for fund and factor 
returns using total returns. 
The Australian 90-day Treasury Note rate was used as a proxy for the risk­
free rate, in accordance with standard practice. The ASX All Ordinaries Total Return 
Index was used as a proxy for the market return. Drew & Stanford (2001) used the 
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top 100 companies total return index as a proxy for the market return, but this index 
will not include returns for smaller stocks. The ASX All Ordinaries Index includes 
99% of all Australian listed companies, and this index is chosen to represent the 
market factor. 
The MSCI Growth and Value Total Return Indices were used to proxy for 
growth and value stocks. These indices split companies by their book-to-market 
ratio, so that the 50% of the stocks with the highest book-to-market ratios are 
included in the value-index and the remaining stocks are included in the growth­
index. The MSCI Growth and Value indices do, however, only include the top 60% 
of listed stocks by market capitalisation (MSCI, 2001). The UBSWA Composite All 
Maturities Bond Total Return Index was used to proxy for the domestic fixed interest 
return. The S&P/ASX Small Ordinaries Total Return Index was used as a proxy for 
returns on small capitalisation stocks, and the S&P/ASX 100 Total Return Index was 
used as a proxy for returns on large capitalisation stocks. The self-constructed very 
small capitalisation total return index was used as a proxy for the otherwise omitted 
smallest stocks listed. 
All returns series, including the fund return series, were converted into series 
of monthly returns from the total reinvested return, i.e. month-to-month changes in 
reinvested holdings were calculated. 
Linear regressions were run for each fund and the indices, and the parameters 
were estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), with heteroskedasticity (White) 
consistent coefficient covariance 26. 
25 The model is specified R;,R11 =a;+/3m,{Rm-Rft)+/3s.<R,,,R,1)+/3g1{Rg,Rv1)+/3d,{Rd,Rfi)+£; , where 
R ,., 1 represents return on very small capitalisation stocks minus return on large capitalisation stocks at 
r6
e
T
ri
h°? �-
. 
C 1· 
. . 
h EV' f k 1s 1s a menu option 1or mear regress10ns usmg t e 1ews so tware pac age. 
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Table 4 - Jensen alphas calculated using the "small" proxy 
Model: RirRp = ai+ /Jml Rm-Rp) + /Jsl RsrRu) + /Jgl RgrRvt) + /Jdl RdrR11) +£i 
fund a t-stat. /Jm /Js /Jg /Jd Adj. R
2 
MAETG Jun92-Aug01 0.0026* 2.5143 0.8176 0.0966 0.0646 0.1091 0.9 145 
Aug98-Aug01 0.0036* 2.0987 0.8428 0.1290 -0.0120 0.0854 0.901 3 
Aug99-Aug01 0.0016 0.7743 0.8642 -0.0 103 0.07 14 0.21 33 0.9056 
Challenger SRI Jun92-Aug01 -0.0013 -0.7731 0.4065 0.1046 -0.0842 0.1 655 0.4424 
Aug98-Aug0 1 -0.001 5  -0.3763 0.375 1 -0.0597 -0.0362 0.01 59 0.1674 
Aug99-Aug01 -0.0015 -0.3 1 37 0.4898 -0.1848 0.0220 -0. 1595 0.2544 
Australian Ethical Sep94-Aug0 1 0.0022 1.4276 0.7999 0.1636 0.0485 -0. 1 856 0.7930 
Aug98-Aug01 0.0023 1.2296 0.7989 0.0407 0.0863 0.1500 0.8464 
Aug99-Aug01 0.0020 0.6340 0.9016 0.0623 0.0074 0.2361 0.8560 
i Tower Eth. Gr. Dec98-Aug01 0.00 1 9  0.6884 1 .0440 0.0505 0.0858 0.3299 0.8304 
Tower Eth. NEF Dec98-Aug01 0.0013 0.4879 1 .0323 0.0521 0.0847 0.2649 0.8249 
1. 
Glebe Blue Chip Jul97-Aug01 0.0025 1 .2001 0.7794 0.0824 0.0647 0.0109 0.7854 9 
. , Aug98-Aug0 I 0.0028 1 .1453 0.6811 0.1205 -0.0474 0.2020 0.7159 
l. Aug99-Aug0 I 0.0042 1 .273 1 0.6 179 -0.0 1 97 0. 1 4 14 -0.0964 0.5606 
•' 
Glebe Mid Cap Jul97-Aug01 0.0026 0.6657 0.7466 -0.0203 0. 1 45 1  0.1458 0.6062 
Aug98-Aug01 0.0038 0.8586 0.7495 0. 1 397 0.3860 -0.2374 0.5527 
Aug99-Aug01 0.0030 0.5118 0.7509 0.4882 0.0858 -0.1904 0.5495 
MSAEG Jun92-Aug01 0.00 12  1 .5777 0.7756 0.4383 0.1450 -0.3713 0.9480 
Aug98-Aug0 1 0.0025* 2. 1 1 05 0.7522 0.0980 0.0410 0.0860 0.9372 
Aug99-Aug0 I 0.0023 1 .3062 0.7360 0.0296 0.1 1 1 7  0.0338 0.9001 
Tower Sup. Eth. I Jan95-Aug01 0.0009 0.5978 0.7251 0.1 8 1 3  0.0087 -0.1202 0.7627 
Aug98-Aug01 0.0028 1 .5036 0.8030 0.0862 0.0388 0. 1582 0.8525 
Aug99-Aug01 0.0024 0.7430 0.9012 0.0625 0.0078 0.2413 0.8560 
Tower Sup. Eth.2 Jan95-Aug0 I 0.0023 1 .4347 0.7996 0.1 633 0.0487 -0. 1817 0.7932 
Aug98-Aug0 I 0.0023 1 .2310 0.7989 0.0866 0.0405 0.1524 0.8466 
Aug99-Aug0 I 0.0020 0.6333 0.90 15  0.0622 0.0077 0.2398 0.8559 
Aust. Eth. S .. Lrg. Dec98-Aug01 0.0010 0.721 0.5434 0.4797 -0.0546 -0.4932 0.7897 
Aust. Eth. S .. Equ. Dec98-Aug0 I 0.0007 0.673 0.5094 0.4557 -0.0829 -0.2812 0.7979 
*Coefficients are significant at the 5% level. 
Parameters are estimated by OLS with heteroskedasticity (White) consistent covariance. 
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Table 5 - Jensen alphas calculated using the "very small" proxy 
Model: RirRft =ai+/3mlRm-Rjt)+/3slRvsrR11)+/3glRgrRvr)+/3dlRdrRJt)+£i 
fund a t-stat. f3m /3s {3g /3d Adj. R2 
MAETG Jun92-Aug0l 0.00 1 3  1 .2794 0.7722 -0. 1 995 0.05 1 1  0.0900 0.9245 
Aug98-Aug0l 0.0018 1 .0359 0.7949 -0. 1460 0.0979 0.0028 0.9244 
Aug99-Aug0 l 0.0004 0.2060 0.804 1 -0. 1 1 1 2 0.0553 0. 1 399 0.9256 
Challenger SRI Jun92-Aug0l -0.0024 - 1 .5244 0.362 1 -0. 1 784 -0.0946 0. 152 1  0.453 1  
Aug98-Aug0l -0.0033 -0.8263 0.3267 -0. 1499 -0.0950 -0.0807 0. 1 979 
Aug99-Aug0 l -0.0027 -0.52 15  0.3601 -0.2 1 36 -0.0504 -0.3365 0.2790 
Australian Ethical Sep94-Aug0l 0.0002 0. 159 1  0.74 1 1 -0. 1 876 0.0458 -0.2076 0.79 1 9  
Aug98-Aug0l 0.0003 0. 1 6 1 8  0.7489 -0. 1482 0.0623 0.0920 0.8697 
Aug99-Aug0l 0.0009 0.327 1 0.8706 -0.0683 0.0 148 0.2060 0.8575 
Tower Eth. Gr. Dec98-Aug0l -0.0002 -0.0735 0.9752 -0. 1 58 1  0.0594 0.2425 0.8504 
Tower Eth. NEF Dec98-Aug0 l -0.0008 -0.2960 0.9634 -0. 1 585 0.0586 0. 1 770 0.8453 
Glebe Blue Chip Jul97-Aug0l 0.00 1 3  0.5629 0.7 1 35 -0. 1 146 0. 1 1 83 0.0835 0.7958 
Aug98-Aug0 l 0.00 1 3  0.5 1 77 0.6399 -0. 1 288 0.0878 0. 1 1 10 0.7349 
Aug99-Aug0 l 0.0028 0.7826 0.543 1 -0. 1 373 0. 1 1 98 -0. 1 886 0.5979 
Glebe Mid Cap Jul97-Aug01 0.0005 0.6996 0.8036 0. 1044 0.25 14 -0. 1568 0.5023 
Aug98-Aug01 0.0041 0.763 1 0.7839 0. 1 358 0.22 1 7  0.0232 0.4590 
Aug99-Aug01 0.003 1 0.4395 0.9477 0.2902 0.2438 0. 10 17  0.4300 
MSAEG Jun92-Aug0 1 0.00 1 1 0.2260 0.7520 -0.0903 0.06 1 8  0.0065 0.9463 
Aug98-Aug0 l 0.0018  l .3947 0.7362 -0.045 1 0.0948 0.0824 0.9378 
Aug99-Aug01 0.0017  0.9 1 20 0.7 1 92 -0.0364 0. 1 148 0.0 1 70 0.9012  
Tower Sup. Eth. I Jan95-Aug0 I -0.0009 -0.5900 0.655 1 -0.26 1 1 -0.0041 -0. 1 365 0.7688 
Aug98-Aug0 l 0.0008 0.4905 0.7544 -0. 1444 0.0626 0. 1 0 1 3  0.8745 
Aug99-Aug0l 0.00 1 2  0.461 3  0.8706 -0.0677 0.0153 0.2 1 1 6  0.8573 
Tower Sup. Eth.2 Jan95-Aug0 l 0.0003 0. 1 696 0.74 10  -0. 1 87 1  0.0460 -0.2037 0.7920 
Aug98-Aug01 0.0003 0. 1 652 0.7490 -0. 1478 0.0626 0.0945 0.8697 
Aug99-Aug0 1 0.0009 0.3280 0.8707 -0.0680 0.0 1 5 1  0.2099 0.8574 
Aust. Eth. S .. Lrg. Dec98-Aug0 1 -0.0008 -0.3340 0.6409 0.236 1 0. 1 14 1  -0.5058 0.7963 
Aust. Eth. S . .  Equ. Dec98-Aug01 -0.001 l -0.4 1 1 0  0.6 1 07 0.2444 0.0822 -0.2837 0.8094 
*Coefficients are significant at the 5% level. 
Parameters are estimated by OLS with heteroskedasticity (White) consistent covariance. 
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4.3.2 Analysis of the results 
The estimated alphas estimated over the full period since the start of the 
funds, as well as over the most recent available 3-year and last 2-year periods, are 
provided in tables 4 and 5 ,  where Table 4 displays the estimated betas using the 
small proxy for the size factor and Table 5 displays the estimated betas using the 
very small proxy for the size factor. 
Autocorrelation, or serial correlation, is tested for and found not to be present 
in the monthly observations. The R-squared values are adjusted by the degrees of 
freedom (the excess of the number of observations over the number of coefficients, 
including the intercept) for the individual regressions (Studenmund, 2001). 
The alpha-values for the general SRI funds and the superannuation SRI funds 
are analysed in sequence. Significance of alphas is determined by the t-statistic for a 
maximum level of 5%, using two-tailed t-tests for statistical significance of 
coefficients. 
The general SRI funds 
The choice of proxy for the small capitalisation stocks does not appear to 
have a large or consistent effect on the R-squared values. The MAETG Index alphas 
are only significantly different from zero when using the standard size factor, and 
only for the full period and the last 3-year period over which the index out-performed 
by 26 and 36 basis points per month ( or 3 . 12% and 4.32% per annum) on average, 
respectively. 
All general SRI funds alphas are insignificantly different from zero. The 
Challenger SRI fund and the Glebe Mid Cap fund have relatively low adjusted R­
squared values, implying that the models do not explain much more than 50-60% of 
the variation in returns 27• 
27 The adjusted R2 for these funds suggest no consistency in model "preference" in terms of the proxy 
used in the size factor. 
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Comparing the general SRI funds to the benchmark index we cannot accept 
the hypothesis that all SRI funds perform differently to the benchmark index for all 
time periods using both proxies for the size factor. The benchmark index over­
perform for the full period and the last 3-year using the "small" proxy in size factor 
only, suggesting the general SRI funds under-performed compared to the benchmark 
over these time periods. 
The superannuation SRI funds 
The MSAEG Index shows no "preferences" in terms of model specification 
judging by the adjusted R-squared values. The index alphas are significant, at the 5% 
level, only for the last 3-year period, and only when using the "small" proxy in the 
size factor. The magnitude of the alpha is 25 basis points per month (or 3% per 
annum). 
The alphas for the superannuation SRI funds are all insignificantly different 
from zero, for all time periods using both proxies in the size factor 28. 
Comparing the superannuation SRI fund to the benchmark index we cannot 
accept the hypothesis that the superannuation SRI fund in the sample performed 
differently to the benchmark index over all time periods using all models. The 
benchmark index alpha is significantly different from zero only over the last 3-year 
period and only using the "small" proxy in the size factor, suggesting that the 
superannuation SRI funds under-performed compared to the benchmark index over 
the last 3-year period. 
In conclusion, the results from this analysis do not support the assumption 
that SRI funds, general and superannuation, consistently perform differently 
compared to their benchmark indices over all time periods. The Jensen alphas for the 
general and superannuation SRI funds are not significantly different from zero over 
the August 1999-August 2001 period, nor are the alphas for the respective 
28 The superannuation SRI funds seemed to take a mild "preference" to the models using the very 
small proxy in the size factor. 
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benchmark indices. There is, however, some evidence that both the general and the 
superannuation SRI funds performed differently compared to their respective 
benchmark indices over the August 1998-August 200 1 period, and that they also 
performed differently compared to the benchmark index over the full period 29. 
4.3.3 Model-specific limitations 
The low adjusted R-squared values of some of the fund regressions imply that 
the model used for these funds or the benchmark proxies are not very well specified. 
The Challenger SRI fund stands out in this context, with extremely low adjusted R­
squared values, but also the Australian Ethical fund and to a certain extent the Glebe 
Mid Cap fund have low R-squared values. The adjusted R-squared values for the 
superannuation SRI funds are consistently high, however. 
Tracking error between the benchmark indices and the funds should be 
minimised by using the Morningstar sub-category indices for general Australian 
equity trusts and superannuation Australian equity funds, which aim to take account 
of such fees and costs as far as is possible 30. Limitations may remain, how�ver, 
depending on how well the Morningstar indices reflect real reinvested returns for the 
funds included, net of all costs and fees. 
Another limitation of this analysis it that, ideally, the benchmarks should 
reflect the stated investment style of the fund. Funds labelled "growth" or "large", for 
instance, should arguably be compared to growth-style and large-style fund 
benchmarks (such as the Industry Indices used by Cummings (2000)). Since the 
objective of the analysis is to investigate whether SRI funds perform differently to 
non-SRI funds, general and superannuation, rather than how the individual SRI funds 
perform compared to non-SRI funds with similar style, following their stated 
29 This contradicts the findings by Cummings (2000), whose findings did not include any significant 
over-performance of the Australian Ethical fund. The models used do, however, give very low 
adjusted R-squared values when analysing the returns from this fund. 
30 See part 4. 1 for more information on the Morningstar Index methodology. 
58 
investment style, such benchmarks are not used in this study 31 . 
The next section explores risk by exposure to asset classes in the context of 
Australian SRI funds. 
4.4 Assessing risk by exposure 
The objective of this part of the analysis is to assess the extent to which, if at 
all, SRI funds' exposures to asset classes and sectors of the economy differ from that 
of managed funds in general, judging from how they behave in the market place. The 
objective of the analysis is not to evaluate the styles of the SRI funds in terms of how 
appropriate they might be. The objective of the analysis is solely to determine 
whether they differ from the respective benchmark indices in terms of investment 
styles, as financial assets. 
This objective is approached from two different angles. Firstly, the funds' 
exposures to asset classes are examined, where the style factors include book-to­
market value, size, fixed interest, cash and international equity. Secondly, the funds' 
exposures to industry sectors are examined. The latter analysis explores fund 
exposures, firstly, to a broad breakdown of industry sectors, and secondly, to a more 
specific breakdown of these. Whilst the former type of style analysis has frequently 
been applied and discussed by professionals, this latter form of analysis is not 
evident in the existing literature (but has, as mentioned earlier, been suggested by 
Buetow et al., 200 1). The reason for this may be that non-SRI funds are typically 
assumed to be diversified across industries and economic sectors, in which case 
"inclusion of factors related to differences in industry and sector returns will add 
little, if any, explanatory power to a model designed to explain fund returns" 
(Sharpe, 1992 p. 9). However, because SRI funds have, in the literature, been 
assumed not to be as well diversified across industries as non-SRI funds, it appears 
31 Roll 's ( 1992) critique of the minimisation of tracking error does not apply to the present study, as 
the objective is to investigate whether there are any significant differences in fund returns compared to 
the indices. These indices do not represent a market portfolio proxy, but rather a weighted average of 
all available Australian equity funds under the general and superannuation categories 
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an interesting application, and will provide important evidence to the SRI fund 
debate. 
4.4.1 Style analysis with asset classes as explanatory variables 
Objectives 
This part of the study applies style analysis to investigate whether the 
screening practices amongst Australian SRI funds give rise to over and under­
exposures to style-factors compared to the relevant benchmark indices. Differences 
in exposures between the SRI funds and their respective benchmark indices may 
indicate that SRI funds differ from comparable non-SRI funds in .terms of style. 
Differences in fund exposures may arise from sources other than screening practices, 
but if we make the assumption that SRI fund managers are not significantly different 
in their stock-picking skills compared to other fund managers we are left with risk 
stemming from screening practices of SRI funds. 
Model specification 
The size of the market surveyed naturally places limitations on how many 
factors can justifiably be included in the model. Whereas larger markets, particularly 
the U.S. market, have a large and well diversified universe of investable securities 
and with an extensive range of benchmark indices available, smaller markets, such as 
Australia, have a dramatically smaller universe of investable securities and a smaller 
range of benchmark indices available. The model used in this analysis is an eight­
factor model, where the included factors are large-capitalisation growth, large­
capitalisation value, medium-capitalisation, small-capitalisation, very small­
capitalisation, fixed interest, cash equivalents, and international equity 32. These 
32 Proxies with growth/value splits of stocks smaller than those included in the top 60% by market 
capitalisation were not found for the Australian market, among those provided by Datastream. 
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factors very closely fulfil the requirement that the factors must be mutually 
exclusive. They are, of course, selected with the constraint of the index availability. 
Choosing and gathering the data used to proxy for the factors 
Table 6 illustrates the break-down of size and book-to-market specific indices 
relevant to the chosen factors as of June 2(X)() 33, and Table 7 summarises the factors 
included in the model and the proxies used for these factors. 
Table 6 - Percentile Splits for Market Capitalisation 
Number of 
Percent of market companies 
capitalisation included 
(MSCI Growth + Value) (60 %) (not available) 
S&P/ASX 50 77.87 % 50 
S&P/ ASX Mid 50 8.35% 50 
S&P/ ASX Small Ords 7.52% 200 
ASX All Ords 99%* 492 
All l isted companies 1 00% 1 263 
* This is the percentage of all listed companies included into ASX All Ordinaries i ndex, 
it is not the sum of the listed proportions. 
(Sources: ASX Monthly Index Analysis, June 2(X)(), and the MSCI Methodology 
Book, 200 1) 
The MSCI growth and value indices are used as proxies for large­
capitalisation growth and value stocks. As Table 5 indicates, the MSCI growth and 
value indices account for the top 60% of Australian listed companies by market 
33 Such information is available in the Monthly Index Analysis booklets published by the ASX 
Operations Pty Ltd. The publication of these, however, ceased in June 2000, and the figures provided 
in Table 5 therefore represents the most recent information available. Because the S&P/ASX Mid50, 
and Small Ordinaries i ndices used in the present study were constructed after June 2000 by Standard 
& Poor ( these indices were then constructed based on historical data, starting from June 1 992), the 
June 2000 publication represents the only readily available source of this information. 
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Table 7 - Factors included in the style by asset class analysis and proxies 
Factor 
Large-cap growth 
Large-cap value 
Mid-cap 
Small-cap 
Very small-cap 
Fixed interest 
Cash 
International equity 
Description Proxy* 
Stocks i n  the top 60% MSCI Growth Total Return 
percentile by market Index - Australia 
capitalisation, with high book-
to-market ratios 
Stocks in the top 60% 
percentile by market 
capitalisation, with low book­
to-market ratios 
The smaller 50 of the top I 00 
stocks listed on the ASX, by 
market capitalisation 
The smaller 200 of the top 
300 stocks listed on the ASX, 
by market capitalisation 
The remaining stocks, among 
those included in the ASX All 
Ordinaries, after the top 300 
stocks are taken out 
Domestic bonds of all 
maturities 
Cash equivalents with less 
than 3 months to maturity 
All international stocks 
MSCI Value Total Return 
Index - Australia 
S&P/ ASX Midcap 50 Total 
Returns Index 
S&P/ ASX Small Ordinaries 
Total Return Index 
Very small ordinaries total 
return index (self­
constructed) 
UBSW A Composite All 
Maturities B ond Total 
Return Index 
Australian 90-day Treasury 
Note 
MSCI World Accumulation 
Index 
* All indices, including those used to construct the very small capitalisation i ndex, were obtained 
through Datastream. 
capitalisation 34, whereas the S&P/ASX top50 account for the top 77.87% as of June 
2000. This means that 17.87% of the S&P/ASX top50 is potentially unaccounted for 
in the model as at June 2000. This is a potential weakness of the proxies. It is, 
however, only a problem to the extent that these value and growth indices are not 
reflective of the equivalent split in the S&P/ASXtop50. As a means of attempting to 
check whether the "missing" return series reduces the explanatory power of the 
model, the S&P/ASXtoplOO Total Return Index was substituted for the MSCI 
34 This percentage will be increased to 85% by November 30 2001 (MSCI, 2001 ). 
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growth and value indices to see if this had any effect on the R-squared values. No 
significant effect on the R-squared values was evident, suggesting that no significant 
loss of explanatory power is incurred by omitting this proportion. 
As anecdotal evidence suggests that SRI funds have a propensity to invest in 
small companies, the very small capitalisation index referred to in the performance 
analysis ( section 4.3. 1) was included. 
The MSCI World Accumulation Index was used to proxy for international 
equity. No "world-ex-Australia" was available, and since Australia would account 
for a very small part of the world index it was assumed that this index would serve as 
a good proxy for international equity. This approach was also adopted by 
Groenewoller et al. (200 1) when applying style analysis to New Zealand managed 
trusts. 
The factors in the model are thus mutually exclusive, as close to exhaustive as 
possible given the resources available, and well in keeping with standard procedure. 
A correlation matrix of the included factor proxies is provided in part 7.2. 1 of the 
appendices. 
The model is given by 
Ri = /3gi*(large-cap growth) + /3vi *(large-cap value) +f3mi*(mid-cap) 
+ f3si*(small-cap) + f3vsi*(very small-cap) + /3bi *(fixed interest) 
+ /3ci*(cash) + /3wi*(int 'l equity) + Ei (8) 
where = 
= 
f3vi = 
return on fund i ;  
fund i's sensitivity to returns on large-capitalisation 
growth stocks; 
fund i's sensitivity to returns on large-capitalisation 
value stocks; 
f3m i  = fund i's sensitivity to returns on medium-capitalisation 
stocks; 
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/3si fund i' s sensitivity to returns on small capitalisation 
stocks; 
/Jvsi fund i' s sensitivity to returns on very small 
capitalisation stocks; 
/3bi fund i's sensitivity to returns on fixed interest 
securities; 
f3ci fund i's sensitivity to returns on cash equivalents; 
/Jwi fund i' s sensitivity to returns on international equity; 
€i random error term. 
Analysis of the results 
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 8. Estimates for the full 
period (since start) is presented for all funds, and as the R-squared values and betas 
estimated tend to vary with the number of observations included in the regression, it 
is therefore necessary to include estimates for shorter time-periods in the table as 
well. Thus, estimates from the last 3 and 2-year periods are included for funds with 
longer histories. "Rolling windows" displaying changes in funds' factor exposures 
over time are not produced in this study as the histories of the majority of the funds 
included are very short 35 . 
The R-squared values suggest that the model is able to explain between 48% 
and 95% of fund returns. Most of the funds have acceptable R-squared values, 
however, the lower values suggest the return series of some funds are not as well 
explained by the model. The lowest R-squared values are found for the Challenger 
SRI fund (0.4871 ), Australian Ethical (0.5 177) and the Australian Ethical Super 
Large (0.54 12). 
35 Also, the magnitude of the R2 appears to vary across the funds rather than over the individual funds' 
time-frames, implying that changing the number of included observations does not dramatically 
change the "goodness of fit" of the model. 
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Table 8 - Style analysis: Asset classes 
large large mid-cap small very fixed cash Int '! R2 
fund growth value small interest equity 
MAETG 
Jun92-Aug01 .2958 .2426 0 1 326 .1329 .0989 .0371 .0601 .9275 
Aug98-Aug01 .2694 .21 22 .2432 .0428 .0189 0 .1475 .0660 .9108 
Aug99-Aug01 .2478 .3347 .3125 .0264 0 .01 24 0 .0662 .9515  
Challenger SRI fund 
Jun92-Aug01 .0145 .2270 0 1 184 .0749 .1 320 .4333 0 .4871 
Aug98-Aug01 .0456 .2594 .1767 0 0 0 .5183 0 .2809 
Aug99-Aug01 .1 235 .2903 .1746 0 0 0 .41 15  0 .3870 
Australian Ethical 
Sep94-Aug01 .0042 .0025 .0478 .4785 0 0 .3911 .0760 .5177 
Aug98-Aug01 0 .0446 0 .4395 .03 1 8  0 .3749 .1091 .4901 
Aug99-Aug01 .0201 .0688 0 .5016 0 0 .2323 .1773 .6986 
Tower Eth. Growth 
Dec98-Aug01 .341 2 .3697 0 .274 1 .0149 0 0 0 .8554 
Tower Ethical NEF 
Dec98-Aug01 .3422 .3709 0 .2807 .0062 0 0 0 .8564 
Glebe Blue Chip 
Jul97-Aug01 .2837 .1480 0 0 .2683 .0383 .1630 .0986 .8087 
Aug98-Aug01 .2503 .1778 .2279 0 0 .1 359 .0673 .1409 .7392 
Aug99-Aug0 I .2454 .1 172 .2271 0 0 0 .2450 .1653 .7026 
Glebe Mid Cap 
Jul97-Aug01 .0846 0 0 .2683 .3264 0 .1 283 .1924 .6647 
Aug98-Aug01 .0775 0 .2510 .2708 0 0 .1684 .2323 .6377 
Aug99-Aug01 0 0 .3046 .3 1 81 0 .0221 0 .3551 .7064 
MSAEG 
Jun92-Aug01 .2817 .2163 .0350 .0907 .1541 0 .1853 .0370 .9565 
Aug98-Aug01 .2694 .21 22 .2432 .0428 .0189 0 .1475 .0660 .9339 
Aug99-Aug01 .2475 .1945 .2550 .0574 0 0 .1607 .0849 .9278 
Tower Sup. Eth.I 
Jan95-Aug01 .1991 .2308 0 .2697 0 0 .25 1 4  .0490 .7903 
Aug98-Aug01 .3183 .2854 .0888 .1757 0 .0526 .0793 0 .8520 
Aug99-Aug01 .181 1 .4222 . 1 819 . 1726 0 .0423 0 0 .9041 
Tower Sup. Eth.2 
Jan95-Aug01 .2637 .2286 0 .2876 0 0 .2074 .0126 .9087 
Aug98-Aug01 .3195 .2834 .0831 . 1 777 0 .0495 .0868 0 .8509 
Aug99-Aug01 .1813 .4227 .1818 .1724 0 .04 19  0 0 .9042 
Aust. Eth. Sup. lrg. 
Dec98-Aug01 0 0 .0476 .3512 0 0 .3265 .2748 .6480 
Aust. Eth. Sup. Equit. 
Dec98-Aug01 0 .0078 .1030 .3493 0 0 .4165 . 1 234 .541 2 
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The general SRI funds 
The MAETG Index is, according to the estimated model parameters, fairly 
equally exposed to the large growth and the large value factors, with magnitudes of 
25-30%. Exposures to the mid-cap factor are of similar magnitudes for the last 3 and 
2-year periods, but zero for the full period. Exposures to the small and the very small 
factors are similar but very varied, and of consistently lesser magnitudes than the 
large factors (0- 13%). Exposure to the fixed interest and the cash equivalents factors 
are also very inconsistent, varying from zero to nearly 15%. Exposure to 
international equity is fairly constant at just over 6%. 
When looking at the general SRI funds, no consistent pattern is found in 
terms of exposure to the growth and value factors. The Challenger SRI, Australian 
Ethical, and Glebe Mid Cap funds have much smaller exposures, the two Tower 
Ethical funds have moderately higher exposures and the Glebe Blue Chip fund has 
similar exposures to the growth factor when compared with the benchmark index. 
The Australian Ethical and Glebe Mid Cap funds have much smaller, the two Tower 
Ethical funds have much higher, the Glebe Blue Chip fund have moderately lower 
and the Challenger SRI fund has similar exposures to the value factor when 
compared to the benchmark index. The results indicate that the Tower Ethical 
Growth fund, whose name suggests higher exposure to growth stocks, has similar 
exposures to growth and value stocks. 
The general SRI funds appear to have varying exposures to large stocks in 
total (as implied by adding the exposures to the large growth and large value factors). 
The two Tower Ethical funds have much higher, the Australian Ethical and Glebe 
Mid Cap funds have much lower and the Challenger SRI and Glebe Blue Chip funds 
give only slightly smaller exposures to the collapsed large factor. This therefore 
provides little support to the hypothesis that SRI funds have consistently lower 
exposures to large stocks compared to other funds. 
In summary, the general SRI funds differ, amongst themselves, more in 
exposure to large stocks in total than in any particular direction between growth and 
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value stocks. These results do therefore not support the hypothesis that SRI funds 
differ from other funds in terms of exposure to growth or value stocks. 
The MAETG Index shows an exposure to the mid-cap factor of zero for the 
full time period, but of 24% and 3 1  % for the last 3 and 2-year periods, respectively. 
The general SRI funds have similar or lower exposures to this factor, but these 
exposures are all very inconsistent over time ( possibly suggesting that the factor may 
tend to be inconsistent in its representation more so than that the funds are 
inconsistent in their exposures over time). The Australian Ethical and the two Tower 
Ethical funds have much lower, the Challenger SRI fund gives slightly lower and the 
two Glebe funds have similar exposures to the mid-cap factor compared to the 
benchmark index. Overall this may suggest general SRI funds have lower exposures, 
on average, to the mid-cap factor compared to other comparable funds. 
The pattern of varying exposures to the mid-cap factor is almost exactly 
reversed in the exposures to the small factor. This actually seems to be the case for 
both the benchmark index and for all the general SRI funds. The Australian Ethical, 
Glebe Mid Cap and the two Tower Ethical funds give much higher exposures and the 
Challenger and Glebe Blue Chip funds give similar exposures to the small factor 
compared to the benchmark index. These results therefore mildly support the idea 
that SRI funds have higher exposures to small stocks than other funds. 
No notable difference between the general SRI funds and the benchmark 
index is found when comparing exposures to the fixed interest factor. The estimated 
factor exposures are inconsistent over time with no visible pattern. In terms of the 
cash equivalents factor, the Challenger SRI and Australian Ethical funds give much 
higher, the two Glebe funds give slightly higher and the two Tower Ethical funds 
give similar exposures to this factor. This suggests the general SRI funds on average 
are more exposed to movements in the cash equivalents than the benchmark index. 
No consistent pattern is found for the general SRI fund exposures to the 
international equity factor. The two Glebe funds give much higher, Australian 
Ethical fund gives slightly higher and the Challenger SRI and the two Tower Ethical 
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funds give similar exposures to the international equity factor when compared to the 
benchmark index. 
The stated investment strategy of the Glebe Blue Chip fund, according to 
Morningstar (200 1), is to invest in stocks among the top 100 stocks listed on the 
ASX, by market capitalisation. This implies that this fund should show higher 
exposures to the large and the mid-cap factors, which also is evident by the estimated 
betas ( this evidence is stronger for the last 3 and 2-year periods). The Glebe Mid Cap 
fund aims, according to Morningstar (200 1), to invest in the ASX securities ranked 
between the 501h and the 1501h by market capitalisation. This implies that this fund 
should show higher exposures to the mid-cap and small factors, which is evident by 
the estimated betas. (This evidence is, again, stronger for the last 3 and 2-year 
periods.) 
The superannuation SRI funds 
The MSAEG Index has slightly higher exposures to the large growth factor 
( 24-28%) than to the large value factor ( 19-2 1  %). The exposures to the collapsed 
large factor are thus between 45% and 50% (hence lower than the MAETG Index). 
Exposures to the mid-cap and small factors are comparable to the MAETG Index. 
Exposures to the fixed interest factor are consistently zero, and exposures to the 
cash-equivalents factor are moderately higher compared to the MAETG Index. 
Exposures to the international equity factor are, however, similar. 
The two Australian Ethical Super funds have much lower and the two Tower 
Super Ethical funds have similar exposures to the large factors compared to the 
benchmark index. In terms of the value factor, the two Tower Super Ethical funds 
have moderately higher and the two Australian Ethical Super funds have much lower 
exposures to this factor. As with the general SRI funds, it seems the superannuation 
SRI funds differ, amongst themselves, more in exposure to large stocks than in any 
particular direction between growth and value stocks. Again, no support is found for 
the idea of SRI funds differing from other funds in terms of exposure to growth or 
value stocks in any systematic way. 
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The two Tower Super Ethical funds have moderately higher and the 
Australian Ethical Super funds have much lower exposures to the large factors 
compared to the benchmark index. In terms of the mid-cap factor, the two Tower 
Super Ethical funds have moderately lower and the two Australian Ethical Super 
funds have much lower exposures to this factor. This may suggest superannuation 
SRI funds tend to have lower exposures to the mid-cap factor. The two Tower Super 
Ethical funds have much higher and the two Australian Ethical Super funds have 
very much higher exposures to the collapsed small factor compared to the benchmark 
index. This does not support the hypothesis that SRI funds have consistently lower 
exposures to larger stocks. The results do support the assumption of higher exposures 
to small stocks as measured by the small stocks, but not by the very small stocks. 
In terms of exposure to the fixed interest factor, the two Tower Super Ethical 
funds have slightly higher and the two Australian Ethical Super funds have similar 
exposures to this factor compared to the benchmark index. The two Tower Super 
Ethical funds have slightly lower and the two Australian Ethical Super funds have 
much higher exposures to the cash equivalent factor. The two Tower Super Ethical 
funds have lower and the two Australian Ethical Super funds have much higher 
exposures to the international equity factor. This may suggest that superannuation 
SRI funds tend to have higher exposures to cash-equivalents. 
The investment strategy of the two Australian Ethical Super funds is specified 
as large stocks for the first, and small stocks for the second of these (Australian 
Ethical Superannuation, 2001). For the Australian Ethical Super Large fund the 
disclosed asset allocation implies around 50% exposure to the large and mid-cap 
factors, 37% to other listed equities ( i.e. small and very small stocks) and 8% cash. 
The estimated factor betas do not correspond to this, and implies that the exposures 
are fairly evenly distributed between the small, cash and international equity factors. 
For the Australian Ethical Super Equities fund the disclosed asset allocation implies 
2 1  % exposure to the large and mid-cap factors, 62% to other listed equities ( i.e. 
small and very small stocks) and 13% cash. The estimated betas, however, imply just 
over 10% exposure to the large and mid-cap factors, 34% to the small factor, 4 1  % to 
cash and 12% to international equities. These figures suggest that, either, these funds 
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are not meeting their targeted asset allocations, or, the factor proxies are not 
representative of the funds' holdings in these asset classes. 
Summary 
The results give no support to the hypothesis that SRI funds differ, in any 
systematic way, from other funds in terms of exposure to growth or value stocks, for 
either general or superannuation SRI funds. 
The general SRI funds do not provide support for the hypothesis that SRI 
funds are consistently less exposed to large stocks compared to other funds, and 
neither do the superannuation SRI funds. The results do, however, provide some 
support to SRI funds having higher exposures to small stocks. The results also 
suggest SRI funds have lower exposures, on average, to the mid-cap factor compared 
to other comparable funds. 
No notable differences between the SRI funds and the benchmark indices are 
found when comparing exposures to th� fixed interest factor. The results do suggest 
SRI funds on average have been more exposed to movements in the cash equivalents 
market than the relevant benchmark indices indicate. No consistent pattern is found 
for the SRI fund exposures to the international equity factor. 
Model-specific limitations 
There are potential problems with the choice of factor proxies. For instance, 
the proxies for the growth and value factors could be improved by including smaller 
stocks. Also, the included factors are not strictly exhaustive or mutually exclusive. 
Fulfilment of these criteria is not necessary, although desirable (Sharpe, 1992). The 
model does not, for instance, include a factor accounting for international fixed 
interest, which may be of some relevance, although arguably not of any significant 
importance. 
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Furthermore, the varying R-squared values for the estimates indicate that the 
model possibly could be specified better for some funds with lower R-squared 
values. For the purposes of this study, however, this is a useful result in itself, as the 
extent to which the R-squared values for the indices are high relative to the SRI 
funds suggests that the variability of SRI fund returns is not explained as well by the 
chosen factor proxies as the variability of the benchmark returns is. 
A well specified model requires the independent variables to have reasonably 
low correlations with each other. Unfortunately, it is inevitable that the factors in a 
model such as the one used in this study have positive correlations of fairly high 
magnitudes implying multicollinearity. It seems logical to assume that returns on 
growth, value, large, small, and international stocks move together to some extent, 
because their profitability is typically driven by common economic forces. 
Calculating the correlations between the individual factors included in the 
model confirms this assumption. The correlations between the growth, value, 
medium, small, very small, and international equities indices are high, ranging from 
0.599 (between value and small) to 0.874 (between medium and small) . This results 
in major limitations of the model. Whereas the betas for the fixed interest factor and 
the cash equivalents factor may be reliably interpreted, as they are fairly lowly 
correlated with the other factors ( at the most 0.426 between fixed interest and 
medium size equities), the betas for the other factors should be interpreted with 
care 36. This problem seems inevitable, and at best only accounted for by always 
acknowledging its presence when interpreting the results. 
Buetow et al. (2000) argue that problems can arise from subjectivity in the 
definitions of investment styles when applying style analysis. Fortunately, this 
criticism does not apply to the present study to the same extent as it may apply to 
independent bodies analysing funds that are pre-classified by investment style. This 
must be so as long as the funds under investigation and their benchmark indices are 
using the same definitions of styles (as is true for this analysis). The criticism does, 
however, have one important implication for the present study, and any other study 
comparing findings from, and assumptions of, investment styles. When making such 
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comparisons one should always bear in mind how styles are defined by the individual 
studies. Assertions that findings from one study contradict or correspond with 
findings of another study should always be made with this in mind. The findings of 
the style analyses in this study should therefore be interpreted and applied with 
reference to the definitions given for the factors included in these models. 
4.4.2 Style analysis with industry sectors as explanatory variables 
Objectives 
The objective for this part of the analysis is to investigate whether Australian 
SRI funds differ from the benchmark indices in exposures to industry sectors. 
Anderson (200 1) suggests industry sectors can be grouped into five categories 
by their alignment with sustainability. These categories, and the industry sectors 
included under each as suggested by Anderson, are reproduced in figure 3. 
Industries of 
the Future Gatekeepers Sensitive Controversial Unacceptable 
Renewable Banking Life Sciences Intensive Alcohol 
Energy Agriculture 
Finance Pharma- Tobacco 
Education ceuticals Forestry 
Retail Gambling 
Healthcare Construction Chemicals 
Leisure Nuclear 
Information Engineering Mining 
Technology Media Military 
Utilities Fossil Fuels 
Water & Waste Telecom Pornography 
Management 
Figure 3 - Industry sectors grouped by alignment with sustainability 
(Source: Anderson, 200 1) 
36 A correlation matrix is provided in part 7 .3. 1 of the appendices. 
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It is possible to relate this to the ASX industry sectors to a certain degree. 
This framework can be used to evaluate whether it appears that SRI funds are 
exhibiting exposures to these categories different to the exposures exhibited by the 
benchmark indices. Two models are specified, one using only broad industry sectors 
and one using specific industry sectors. 
The choice of which industry sectors to include is limited by the indices 
available. The two ASX All Resources and All Industrials indices were chosen for a 
broader break-down of industry sectors. On the other extreme, the 24 ASX specific 
industry sectors were chosen for a more specific break-down, as these fulfilled the 
needs for specificity most accurately. 
Thus, two different models are specified, one broad model using five factors, 
and one more specific model using 27 factors in total. 
Using broad industry sectors as explanatory variables 
Model Specification 
The broad model will analyse the sensitivity of returns of funds and indices to 
the two main sectors in the economy, namely the resources sectors and the industrials 
sector, as well as returns of fixed interest securities, cash holdings and international 
equity. 
The model was specified similarly to the standard style analysis model, but 
using two broad industry factors instead of the style factors (i.e. growth, value, 
medium, small and very small). The model was thus specified as 
where 
Ri = f3Ri *(all resources) +f3ti*(all industrials) + /3bi *(fixed interest) 
+ f3ci*(cash equivalents) + f3wi*(int 'l equity) Ei 
= return on fund i; 
= fund i' s sensitivity to returns on resources stocks; 
(9) 
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f3ci 
/Jwi = 
ei = 
fund i' s sensitivity to returns on industrials stocks; 
fund i' s sensitivity to returns on fixed interest 
securities; 
fund i ' s  sensitivity to returns on cash-equivalents; 
fund i' s sensitivity to returns on international equity; 
random error term. 
The proxies for fixed interest, cash equivalents and international equity 
remain the same as in the original style analysis. The make-up of the two ASX broad 
industry sector indices included are displayed in Table 9 37. 
Table 8 indicates that the overwhelming majority of the total market 
capitalisation and number of companies included in the All Ordinaries is grouped in 
the All Industrial Index. 
The results from the analysis are displayed in Table 10. 
Table 9 - Broad Industry Sectors: Market Capitalisation from /998-2000 
ASX All Resources 
ASX All Industrials 
Aug 1 998 
17.44 
82.56 
% of All Ords 
Aug 1999 
16.87 
83 . 1 1  
June 2000 
14.08 
85.92 
(Source: ASX Monthly Index Analysis, August 1998; August 1999; June 2000) 
37 Ideally figures from August 2000 should be included instead of figures from June 2000, but as 
explained earlier, this data is not made available. This does not pose a problem as the purpose of 
displaying these figures is to provide an indication of how these proportions have changed over the 
sample period. 
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Table JO - Style analysis: Broad industry sectors 
All All Fixed Cash Int '! R2 
fund Resour. lndustr. Interest Equiv. Equity 
MAETG 
Jun92-Aug01 0.1464 0.6688 0.0544 0.1048 0.0257 0.9100 
Aug98-Aug01 0.1027 0.7344 0.0885 0.0690 0.0054 0.8946 
Aug99-Aug01 0.1618 0.681 6  0.1566 0 0 0.9201 
Challenger SRI fund 
Jun92-Aug01 .0145 .2270 0 1 1 84 .0749 .1 320 
Aug98-Aug01 .0456 .2594 .1767 0 0 0 
Aug99-Aug01 .1235 .2903 .1746 0 0 0 
Australian Ethical 
Sep94-Aug0 l .0042 .0025 .0478 .4785 0 0 
Aug98-Aug01 0 .0446 0 .4395 .0318 0 
Aug99-Aug01 .0201 .0688 0 .501 6 0 0 
Tower Eth. Growth 
Dec98-Aug01 .3412 .3697 0 .2741 .0149 0 
Tower Ethical NEF 
Dec98-Aug01 .3422 .3709 0 .2807 .0062 0 
Glebe Blue Chip 
Jul97-Aug01 .2837 .1480 0 0 .2683 .0383 
Aug98-Aug01 .2503 .1778 .2279 0 0 .1 359 
Aug99-Aug01 .2454 .1 172 .2271 0 0 0 
Glebe Mid Cap 
Jul97-Aug01 .0846 0 0 .2683 .3264 0 
Aug98-Aug01 .0775 0 .2510 .2708 0 0 
Aug99-Aug01 0 0 .3046 .31 81 0 .0221 
MSAEG 
Jun92-Aug01 .2817 .2163 .0350 .0907 .1 541 0 
Aug98-Aug01 .2694 .2122 .2432 .0428 .01 89 0 
Aug99-Aug01 .2475 .1945 .2550 .0574 0 0 
Tower Sup. Eth.I 
Jan95-Aug01 .1991 .2308 0 .2697 0 0 
Aug98-Aug01 .3183 .2854 .0888 .1757 0 .0526 
Aug99-Aug01 .1 811 .4222 .1 819 .1726 0 .0423 
Tower Sup. Eth.2 
Jan95-Aug01 .2637 .2286 0 .2876 0 0 
Aug98-Aug01 .3195 .2834 .0831 .1777 0 .0495 
Aug99-Aug01 .1 81 3 .4227 .1 818 .1724 0 .0419 
Aust. Eth. Sup. lrg. 
Dec98-Aug01 0 0 .0476 .3512 0 0 
Aust. Eth. Sup. Equit. 
Dec98-Aug01 0 .0078 .1030 .3493 0 0 
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Analysis of the results 
No consistent pattern is found in terms of differences in exposures between 
the All Resources and All Industrial factors when compared to the benchmark index. 
Amongst the general SRI funds, the Challenger SRI fund has lower exposures 
to both factors, yet the relative weightings between the two are comparable to the 
benchmark index. This is also the case for the Australian Ethical and Glebe Mid Cap 
funds. The two Tower Ethical funds have comparatively higher exposures to the All 
Industrials factor than the exposures indicated by the benchmark index. The Glebe 
Blue Chip fund, however, has comparatively higher exposures to the All Resources 
factor than indicated by the benchmark index. 
Amongst the superannuation SRI funds, the two Tower Super Ethical funds 
have lower exposures to the All Resources and higher exposures to the All 
Industrials factor compared to the benchmark index. The two Australian Ethical 
Super funds have lower exposures to both factors with weightings between these 
comparable to the benchmark index. 
Using specific industry sectors as explanatory variables 
The objective for this section of the analysis is to establish if Australian SRI 
funds differ from their respective indices in terms of exposures to specific industry 
sectors. 
Model Specification 
The specific model will analyse the sensitivity of returns of funds and indices 
to the more specific sectors in the economy, plus returns on fixed interest securities 
and cash holdings. 
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where 
The model is specified by 
R = /3u*(industry 1) + /32i *(industry 2) + . . .  + f324i*(industry 24) 
+ /3hi *(fixed interest) + /3ci *(cash) + /3w; *(int 'l equity) + £i ( 10) 
R; 
/3 u 
/32 i 
/324i 
/3b i 
/3c i 
/Jw i 
£i 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
= 
return on fund i; 
fund i' s sensitivity to returns on industry 1; 
fund i's sensitivity to returns on industry 2; 
fund i's sensitivity to returns on industry 24; 
fund i's sensitivity to returns on fixed interest 
securities; 
fund i's sensitivity to returns on cash-equivalents; 
fund i's sensitivity to returns on international equity; 
random error term. 
The specific industries from 1 to 24, as well as their proportion of the total 
market capitalisation and number of included companies, are listed in Table 11. 
Again, figures later than June 2000 were not made available. 
This is a very large number of explanatory variables to include in any model. 
If a large number of factors causes problems in the interpretation of the results it is 
possible to collapse some of the factors together, or alternatively to use one as a 
proxy for other factors. In this case this would have to be done based on the 
collapsed sectors being related or similar, and this in tum should be reflected in 
relatively high correlations between the sectors that are being collapsed. 
Another possible approach, which may better serve the objective of this 
analysis, is to group the betas estimated for the sub-indices using Anderson's 
framework. Of course, the categorisation of specific industries into such groups is 
highly subjective. Thus, the 24 specific indices are sorted by similar groups 
according to how they best seemed to fit into Anderson's categories, as shown in 
figure 4. An extra "miscellaneous" category is included under which the sub-indices 
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Table 11  - Specific industry Sectors: Market Capitalisation from 1998-2000 
Aug 1998 Aug 1999 Jun 2000 
1 .  Alcohol & Tobacco 2.15 2.1 1 1 .82 
2. Banks & Finance 20.28 20.1 1 20.43 
3. Building Materials 2.84 2.53 1 .47 
4. Chemicals 0.61 0.43 0.49 
5. Developers & Contractors 3.27 3.21 3.14 
6. Diversified Industrials 3.1 1 3.28 2.26 
7. Diversified Resources 9.45 9.2 1 7.90 
8. Energy 2.96 2.82 2.73 
9. Engineering 0.4 1 0.23 0.17 
10. Food & Household Goods 2.30 1.84 1.26 
1 1 . Gold 1 .6 1  1 .21 1 .05 
12. Healthcare & Biotechnology 1 .02 1.60 2.14 
13. Infrastructure & Utilities 1 .57 1.73 1 .76 
14. Insurance 4.36 5.91 4.10 
15. Investment & Financial Serv. 1 .43 1 .72 2.43 
16. Media 1 1 .83 1 1 .22 17.02 
17. Miscellaneous Industrials 3.1 1 1 .30 2. 1 8  
18. Other Metals 3.42 3.65 2.40 
19. Paper & Packaging 1.20 1 .20 0.85 
20. Property 5.86 5.56 5.17 
2 1 .  Retail 4.17 4.17 3.55 
22. Telecommunications 7. 1 1  10.05 1 1 .61 
23. Tourism & Leisure 1 .73 1 .83 1 .56 
24. Transport 3.40 3. 1 0  2.52 
(Source: ASX Monthly Index Analysis, August 1998; August 1999; 
June 2000) 
that do not fit into any of the other categories are placed. None of the sub-indices 
appeared to fit under the "Industries of the Future" category, hence this category was 
omitted. 
Analysis of the results 
Table 12 displays fund exposures to all 27 factors. Some comments on this 
table are provided in part 7 .2 of the appendices. Table 13 displays fund exposures to 
the industry categories sorted by their alignment with sustainability. This table is 
constructed by collapsing the specific industry betas for each category. 
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I t 
Gatekeepers Sensitive Controversial Unacceptable Miscellaneous 
Banks & 
Finance Developers & Building Food & 
Contractors Materials Alcohol & Household 
Insurance Tobacco Goods 
Chemicals 
Investments & Engineering 
Financial Diversified Gold Miscellaneous 
Services Resources Industrials 
Health & 
Media Biotechnology Energy Other 
Metals Property 
Retail Paper & 
Infrastucture & Packaging 
Telecom- Utilities Diversified 
munication Transport Industrials 
Tourism & 
Leisure 
Figure 4 - ASX sub-indices grouped by alignment with sustainability as per 
Anderson 's framework 
The R-squared values for this model are all high, except for the Challenger 
SRI fund, whose R-squared values again are below 0.50. Since all the other R­
squared values are so high, where some of them have been lower using the 
previously specified models, this suggests that there is something about this fund that 
makes its returns variation hard to explain - at least using of the style analysis 
models specified in this study. 
The general SR/funds 
The MAETG Index has the highest exposures for the "gatekeepers" factor 
(which also accounts for 60% of the total market cap) with exposures of around 30%.  
The exposures to the other categories are fairly evenly distributed, with 7.3% and 
5.5% for the "sensitive" factor, 9.6% and 6.2% for the "controversial" factor, 9.6% 
and 18.2% for the "unacceptable" category and 5.6% and 1.2% for the 
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Table 12 - Style analysis: Specific industry sectors 
Develop- Diver- Diver- Food & Health- Infrast-
Alcohol Banks Building Chemi- ers & sified sifted Engi- House- care & ructure 
& & Materials cals Con- Jndust- Resour- Energy neering hold Gold Biotech- & 
R2 Tobacco Finance tractors rials ces Goods nology Utilities 
%of All Ords* 0.01 82 0.2043 0.0 147 0.0049 0.03 14 0.0226 0.079 0.0273 0.0017  0.01 26 0.01 05 0.02 14  0.0176 
Annual compounded return** 20. 1 14.7 -9.3 - 1 7.5 1 2.9 - 10.2 1 . 1  -8.8 - 1 6.3 -23 .2  -2 1 .8 9. 1 10.2 
MAETG Jun92-Aug01 0.8 1 23 0.0704 0.1863 0.0 198 0 0 0.0230 0.0259 0.0348 0.0219 0.0215  0.0257 0.0398 0.0 1 14 
Aug98-Aug01 0.8399 0. 1 1 90 0. 1723 0 0 0 0 0.0172 0.0446 0.0289 0 0.0627 0.0260 0 
Challenger Jun92-Aug01 0.4785 0 0. 1577 0.0278 0 0 0.0984 0 0.0203 0.0442 0.0335 0.0 1 34 0 0 
Aug98-Aug01 0.3763 0 0. 1076 0.0035 0 0 0. 1 257 0 0.0436 0.0522 0 0.0770 0 0 
Aus. Ethical Sep94-Aug01 0.6506 0 0.0733 0.0225 0 0.0329 0 0.027 1 0 0 0.0220 0 0. 1 264 0. 1 228 
Aug98-Aug01 0.7057 0 0.0256 0 0 0. 1 490 0 0.0777 0 0 0.03 19 0.0676 0.0801 0 
Tower Eth. Gr. Dec98-Aug01 0.754 1 0.0373 0.2337 0 0 0 0 0.0245 0 0 0 0 0. 1 939 0 
Tower Eth. N.. Dec98-Aug0 1 0.75 19 0.0390 0.2251 0 0 0 0 0.0224 0 0 0 0 0. 1 880 0 
Glebe B. Chip Jul97-Aug01 0.8243 0 0. 1653 0 0 0 0.0289 0.0920 0.0273 0.0061 0.0654 0 0.0434 0.0301 
Aug98-Aug01 0.8722 0 0. 1 295 0 0 0 0 0. 1056 0.0628 0.0697 0.0288 0.0248 0.0282 0 
Glebe M. Cap Jul97-Aug01 0.7 1 9 1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0960 0 0 0.0190 0 0. 1040 0.239 1 
Aug98-Aug01 0.8221 0.0620 0 0 0 0 0 0.0543 0 0.025 1 0 0 0. 1 182  0.25 17  
MSAEG Jun92-Aug01 0.8499 0.0634 0. 1 1 70 0.04 1 1  0 0 0 0.0799 0.0353 0.0198 0.0283 0.0305 0.0204 0.0014 
Aug98-Aug0 1 0.8970 0.05 18 0. 1 1 20 0 0 0.0041 0 0.0793 0.0395 0.0195 0 0.07 1 2  0.0226 0 
Tower s. Eth. I Jan94-Aug01 0.6783 0. 1537 0. 1 144 0.0201 0 0 0 0 0.0433 0 0 0.0332 0. 1 0 1 2  0 
Aug98-Aug01 0.7240 0. 1097 0. 1 1 53 0 0 0 0 0 0.0404 0 0 0.0696 0.0866 0 
Tower S. Eth. 2 Jan94-Aug01 0.6867 0. 1 345 0. 1098 0.0207 0 0 0 0 0.0449 0.0044 0 0.0355 0.0926 0 
Aug98-Aug01 0.7 1 93 0. 108 1  0. 1 1 3 1  0 0 0 0 0 0.0336 0 0 0.07 14  0.0904 0 
Aust. Eth. S. L. Dec98-Aug01 0.85 1 9  0 0 0 0.0333 0 0 0 0 0. 1 35 1  0 0.0732 0.0590 0 
Aust. Eth. S. E. Dec98-Aug01 0.707 1 0 0.0058 0 0 0. 1 759 0 0.0209 0 0. 1584 0 0.0 152 0.00 16  0 
* Figures from the ASX Monthly Index Analysis (June 2000 p 22). ** Figures from the ASX Monthly Index Analysis (June 2000 p 45), over the last 3 years, given in %.  
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Table 12 (Cont.) 
Invest- Miscel-
ment & laneous Other Paper & Tele- Tourism 
Insurance Financial Media Indust- Metals Pac- Property Retail commun- & Transport Fixed Cash Int'! 
Services rials kaging ications Leisure Interest Equiv. equity 
%of All Ords* 0.0410  0.0410 0.0243 0. 1 702 0.02 18  0.0240 0.0085 0.05 17  0.0355 0. 1 1 61  0.0156 0.0252 
Annual compounded return**  2 . 1  0.4 4 1 .8 14.0 -6.9 - 15 .5 0.9 5.9 20.2 -3.7 16. 1 
MAETG Jun92-Aug01 0 0.03 18  0.0665 0.01 12  0 0 0 0.0183 0.0007 0 0.0156 0. 1 677 0 0.2076 
Aug98-Aug01 0 0 0.0907 0.01 1 8  0 0 0 0.0333 0 0 0 0.2018  0 0. 1 9 19  
Challenger Jun92-Aug01 0 0 0.0 162 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0363 0.2438 0.3010 0.0074 
Aug98-Aug01 0 0 0.01 1 1  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.0485 0. 1 680 0.3627 0 
Aus. Ethical Sep94-Aug01 0 0.0382 0.0467 0.0501 0.0297 0 0 0 0. 1 004 0 0.0224 0 0.2854 0 
Aug98-Aug01 0 0.0040 0.0320 0.0500 0.0614 0 0 0 0.09 18  0 0.0059 0 0.323 1 0 
Tower Eth. Gr. Dec98-Aug0 1 0 0 0. 1695 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2 1 09 0 0. 1 302 
Tower Eth. N .. Dec98-Aug01 0 0 0. 1700 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .2156 0 0. 1 399 
Glebe B. Chip Jul97-Aug01 0 0 0.0097 0 0 0 0.0055 0.0295 0 0 0.0380 0.2326 0 0.2262 
Aug98-Aug01 0 0 0.0047 0 0 0 0 0.0459 0 0 0.0378 0.2705 0 0. 1 9 16  
Glebe M. Cap Jul97-Aug01 0 0.0646 0.0400 0.0469 0 0 0 0.0749 0.0661 0 0.0 1 8 1  0 0.0609 0. 1 704 
Aug98-Aug01 0 0 0.0862 0.0467 0 0 0 0.0785 0.0410 0 0 0.0099 0 0.2265 
MSAEG Jun92-Aug01 0 0.0501 0.0569 0.01 2 1  0 0 0 0.0285 0 0 0.0 1 20 0.2235 0 0. 1799 
Aug98-Aug01 0 0 0.0654 0.02 1 8  0 0 0 0.0504 0 0 0.0067 0.3040 0 0. 1 5 1 6  
Tower S. Eth. I Jan94-Aug01 0 0 0.0889 0.0190 0.0041 0 0 o ·  0 0 0 0.2 1 78 0 0.2043 
Aug98-Aug01 0 0 0. 1 1 15 0 0 0 0 0.0016 0 0 0 0.2706 0 0. 1 948 
Tower S. Eth. 2 Jan94-Aug01 0 0 0.0875 0.0 1 88 0.0143 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.2507 0 0. 1 862 
Aug98-Aug0 1 0 0 0. 1 1 20 0 0 0 0 0.0055 0 0 0 0.2765 0 0. 1 892 
Aust. Eth. S. L. Dec98-Aug01 0 0 0 0.0756 0.0072 0 0 0 0.07 1 8  0.0410 0. 1 2 1 2  0 0.2406 0. 14 19  
Aust. Eth. S. E. Dec98-Aug01 0 0 0.0220 0.0506 0.062 1 0 0 0 0.0680 0 0.0 152 0.0728 0.33 1 3  0 
* Figures from the ASX Monthly Index Analysis (June 2000 p 22). ** Figures from the ASX Monthly Index Analysis (June 2000 p 45), over the last 3 years, given in %.  
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. .  Table 13 - Style analysis: Self-constructed industry grouping by alignment with sustainability 
ll 
Gate- Contra- Unaccep Miscel- Fixed Cash lnt'l 
keepers Sensitive versial -table laneous Interest Equiv. equity 
% of All Ords* 60.7 7 .2 1  15 .96 5.27 1 0.87 
Average Annual Comp. Return** 1 1 .63 3 .98 -5.65 -2.87 - 1 8.50 
MAETG 
Jun92-Aug0 l .3037 .0732 .096 1 .0960 .0557 . 1 677 0 .2076 
Aug98-Aug0 l .2962 .0549 .06 1 8  . 1 8 1 7  .0 1 1 8  .20 1 8  0 . 1 9 1 9  
Challenger SRI fund 
Jun92-Aug0 1 . 1 739 .0442 .0844 .0 1 34 . 1 3 1 9  .2438 .30 1 0  .0074 
Aug98-Aug0 l . 1 1 87 .0522 .0957 .0770 . 1 257 . 1 680 .3627 0 
Australian Ethical 
Sep94-Aug0 l .2586 .2822 .0720 .0297 .072 1 0 .2854 0 
Aug98-Aug0 l . 1 533 .229 1 .0837 . 1 290 .08 19  0 .323 1 0 
Tower Ethical Growth 
Dec98-Aug0l .4032 . 1 939 .0245 .0373 0 . 2 109 0 . 1 302 
Tower Ethical NEF 
Dec98-Aug0l .395 1 . 1 880 .0224 .0390 0 .2 1 56 0 . 1 399 
Glebe Blue Chip 
Ju197-Aug0 l .2045 .0796 . 1 573 0 .0998 .2326 0 .2262 
Aug98-Aug0l . 1 801 .0979 .2063 .0248 .0288 .2705 0 . 1 9 1 6  
Glebe Mid Cap 
Ju197-Aug0l .2455 .3432 . 1 14 1  0 .0659 0 .0609 . 1 704 
Aug98-Aug0l .2056 . 3950 .0543 .0620 .0467 .0099 0 .2265 
Super Aust. Equity 0 
Jun92-Aug0l .2524 .04 1 6  . 1 683 .0939 .0404 .2235 . 1 799 
Aug98-Aug0 l .2278 .0463 . 1 255 . 1 230 .02 1 8  .3040 0 . 1 5 1 6  
Tower Super Ethical Gr. 1 0 
Jan95-Aug0 l .2033 . 1 0 1 2  .0634 . 1 9 1 1 .0 190 . 2 1 78 .2043 
Aug98-Aug0 1 .2284 .0866 .0404 . 1 792 0 .2706 0 . 1 948 
Tower Super Ethical Gr. 2 
Jan95-Aug0l . 1 973 .0970 .0656 . 1 843 .0 1 88 .2507 0 . 1 862 
Aug98-Aug0 l .2306 .0904 .0336 . 1 795 0 .2765 0 . 1 892 
Aust. Eth. Super large 
Dec98-Aug0l . 1 1 28 . 1 94 1  . 1 545 .0804 .0756 0 .2406 . 1 4 19  
Aust. Eth. Super Equit. 
Dec98-Aug0l .0958 .3359 .0361 .0774 .0506 .0728 .33 1 3  0 
* These percentages are calculated by adding up the percentages of the total market capitalisation of the 
individual industries using figures from the ASX Montly Index Analysis (June 2000, p. 22). 
** These are averages of the individual industries' annual compounded returns over the last 3 years (as of June 
2000) based on equal holdings in the included industries using figures from the ASX Montly Index Analysis 
(June 2000, p. 45). 
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"miscellaneous" category, for the full period and the last 3-year period, 
respectively 38. 
The Challenger SRI, Australian Ethical and Glebe Blue Chip funds have 
moderately lower, the Glebe Mid Cap fund has slightly lower and the two Tower 
Ethical funds have moderately higher exposures to the "gatekeepers" factors 
compared to the benchmark index. 
The Australian Ethical, Glebe Mid Cap and the two Tower Ethical funds have 
very much higher and the Challenger SRI and Glebe Blue Chip funds have similar 
exposures to the "sensitive" factor compared to the benchmark index. Given this 
category's low market cap coverage, reflected in the benchmark index, four of the 
general SRI funds seem to be markedly over-exposed to this category, with 
exposures of up to 39%. 
The Glebe Blue Chip fund has slightly higher, the two Tower Ethical funds 
have slightly lower and the Australian Ethical and Glebe Mid Cap funds have similar 
exposures to the "controversial" factor compared to the benchmark index. 
All of the general SRI funds seem to be slightly less exposed to the 
"unacceptable" factor compared to the benchmark index, as would be expected as 
SRI funds typically screen out these stocks. 
Lastly, the Challenger SRI and Australian Ethical funds have slightly higher, 
the two Tower Ethical funds have lower and the two Glebe funds have similar 
exposures to the "miscellaneous" category. 
The superannuation SRI funds 
The MSAEG Index have similar exposures to the factors as does the MAETG 
Index, except for slightly lower exposures to the "gatekeepers" factor, seemingly 
compensated for by slightly higher exposures to the "controversial" factor. The two 
38 Estimates cannot be obtained for periods less than 3 years because the number of explanatory 
variables exceeds the number of observations. 
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Australian Ethical Super funds have lower and the two Tower Super Ethical funds 
have similar exposures to the "gatekeepers" factor compared to the benchmark index. 
The two Tower Super Ethical funds have moderately lower and the two 
Australian Equity Super funds have very much higher exposures to the "sensitive" 
factor. This corresponds to the findings for the general SRI funds. The Australian 
Ethical Super Equities and the two Tower Super Ethical funds have markedly lower 
and the Australian Ethical Super Large fund has similar exposure to the 
"controversial" factor. 
Interestingly, the two Tower Super Ethical Super funds have markedly higher 
exposures to the "unacceptable" factor compared to the industry benchmark (the two 
Australian Ethical Super funds have slightly lower exposures to this factor). The two 
Tower Super Ethical funds have slightly lower, the Australian Ethical Super Large 
fund has slightly higher and the Australian Ethical Super Equities fund has similar 
exposures to the "miscellaneous" factor. 
Summary 
Notable differences in factor exposures between the SRI funds and their 
benchmark indices includes a tendency to higher exposures to the "sensitive" factor 
for both general and superannuation SRI funds. It seems these higher exposures are 
compensated for by lower exposures to the "unacceptable" factor for the general SRI 
funds and lower exposures to the "controversial" factor for the superannuation SRI 
funds. 
Model-specific limitations 
The most prominent limitation of this analysis is the large likelihood of 
multicollinearity due to the large number of explanatory variables, even if correlation 
coefficients between the variables in this case are less correlated with each other 
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compared to the style analysis by asset class model 39• The more variables included 
the higher are the chances of several variables tending to move together. 
Further work could focus on determining a more suitable level of industry 
specificity, where the number of industries are reduced but still representative of the 
total market. Of course, if the broader category break-down is based on how the 
industries conceptually fit together, and the individual groups are diversified 
comparably to the full market, in terms of covariance of returns, then the covariance 
of the group returns is likely to still be high. The problem of multicollinearity in this 
type of style analysis can only really be solved if industries are sorted by their 
covariance - and the groupings of the industries by this measure may well not make 
any sense conceptually. 
39 Whereas the correlations between asset-class variables were up to 87% (between small and medium 
capitalisation) the highest correlation amongst the industry variable is 70% (between the 
miscellaneous industrials industry and the investment and finance industry), and most correlations are 
under 50%. The betas are still biased because of the constraints placed on the regression and not as 
reliable for interpretation as they would be under an unconstrained regression, even if the R-squared 
values are high. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
The SRI industry has experienced exceptional growth and developments over 
the last decades. This is especially evident in the U.S., U.K. and European markets, 
where SRis have evolved from being a niche activity to becoming mainstream. 
Although the Australian SRI industry has not reached this same level of maturity yet 
there is reason to expect strong growth in the near future. Although the SRI industry 
has reached maturity in some markets the evolution of a theoretical framework and 
empirical evidence on how SRis behave as financial assets is yet in an early stage of 
development. Although assumptions and hypotheses are plentiful the literature lacks 
important evidence of how SRis behave as financial assets. Such information is 
important for how these investments, and especially investment funds, are marketed 
and perceived by the industry and the public. 
The present study has investigated Australian general and superannuation SRI 
funds over a total time period from June 1992 to August 2001, and compared these to 
benchmark indices for the general and the superannuation funds, in order provide 
evidence of how SRI funds behave as financial assets, and in particular whether they 
behave differently to comparable non-SRI funds. Thus, three hypotheses were to be 
tested in this study. Hypothesis one (H01) asserts that raw returns and variances are 
the same for SRI funds as for comparable non-SRI funds, the second hypothesis 
(H02) asserts that risk-adjusted performance is the same for SRI funds as for 
comparable non-SRI funds, and the third hypothesis (H03)asserts that exposures to 
asset classes and investment styles are consistent with the benchmark indices. 
The literature presents two opposing hypotheses in regard to whether SRis are 
likely to perform better or worse than non-SRis. The "green dividend" hypothesis 
holds that SRis should perform better, whereas the "green penalty" hypothesis holds 
that they should perform worse. The first two hypotheses to be tested in the present 
study hold that SRI funds do not perform differently to comparable non-SRI fund 
benchmarks. 
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The preliminary observations of the fund returns do not allow the acceptance 
of hypothesis H0 / .  The general and superannuation SRI funds' raw returns are 
different from those of the respective benchmark indices, although not in any 
consistent direction. This result is not of any great importance as raw returns do not 
provide reliable performance measures. 
Jensen alphas were calculated using risk-adjusted returns whilst controlling 
for the market, size, style (growth versus value), and fixed interest factors .  The 
calculated fund alphas were compared to the relevant benchmark alphas in order to 
test hypothesis H02. For the general SRI funds, the results support this hypothesis 
only over the August 1999-August 2001 period, where both the benchmark and the 
fund alphas were consistently insignificantly different from zero. The general fund 
benchmark index alphas were positive and significant for the June 1992-August 2001 
and the August 1998-August 2001 periods, whereas none of the fund alphas were 
significantly different from zero. This implies that the SRI funds have performed 
differently over these time periods, but not over the last 2 years. Significant 
benchmark alphas were found only when using the small (as opposed to the very 
small) stock proxy in the size factor, implying that these findings are sensitive to the 
choice of proxy for small si.ocks. 
For the superannuation SRI funds, the results support hypothesis H02 for the 
June 1992-August 2001 and the August 1998-August 2001, where the fund and 
benchmark alphas were insignificantly different from zero, but not for the August 
1998-August 2001 period, where the fund alphas are insignificantly different from 
zero and the benchmark alpha is positive and significant. This implies that the 
superannuation SRI funds have performed differently to the benchmark over the last 
2-year period, but not over the full and the 2-year periods. Again, the significant 
benchmark alpha was found when using the small stock proxy in the size factor. 
The fact that the alphas calculated using the very small stock proxy in the size 
factor are consistently insignificantly different from zero suggest that H02 holds for 
all funds over all periods when this proxy is used, but not when the small stock proxy 
is used. The evidence supporting H02 is therefore sensitive to the choice of proxy as 
well as the time-period over which the funds are evaluated. 
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The style analysis, employed in order to test hypothesis H03, presents 
important evidence to the SRI debate. SRI funds have been assumed to be more 
heavily weighted in growth rather than value stocks, compared to non-SRI funds. 
The results from the style analysis do not support this assumption. The SRI fund 
exposures to the growth and value factors are consistent with the benchmark 
exposures, and hypothesis Ho3 holds in this context. It has also been assumed that 
SRI funds are more heavily weighted in small rather than large stocks, which is 
mildly supported by the results, and the evidence to support hypothesis H03 is weak 
in this context. Fund exposures to the fixed interest securities and international stocks 
were not different compared to the benchmarks, but the SRI funds tended to have 
higher exposures to cash equivalents. 
The style analysis examining fund exposures across industry sectors reveals 
one note-worthy difference between SRI funds and the benchmark indices. The SRI 
funds have larger exposures to the "sensitive" industry category, suggesting SRI 
funds' positive screens tend to include such stocks. These over-exposures seemed to 
a certain extent to be compensated for by slightly smaller exposures to the 
"unacceptable" industry category in the case of the general SRI funds, suggesting 
these funds' negative screens tend to exclude such stocks. The superannuation SRI 
funds have slightly smaller exposures to the "controversial" industry category, 
suggesting these funds' negative screens tend to exclude these stocks. 
Thus, the hypothesis asserting that factor exposures are consistent with the 
benchmark indices can not be accepted as it stands. It is important to appreciate, 
however, that SRI funds do not have strong consistent patterns in terms of style, but 
vary amongst themselves in factor exposures. They do not represent a homogenous 
category of investments, and they do not belong in an investment class of their own. 
The individual funds are very different amongst themselves, rather than consistently 
different to the benchmark indices, implying these funds should be evaluated on an 
individual basis as they seem to have individual style characteristics. 
The inconsistencies in factor exposures across the individual SRI funds give 
rise to the question of whether individual non-SRI funds have similar inconsistencies 
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in factor exposures. Further analysis would be assisted though a survey of non-SRI 
funds on an individual basis, over the same category. If these funds show more 
consistent patterns of factor exposures than do SRI funds, this may indicate that SRI 
funds are more inconsistent in their exposures than non-SRI funds. 
The most important implication of this study is arguably that the SRI-tag does 
not guarantee any specific asset-class or industry exposure. When evaluating these 
funds as financial assets they must be evaluated as any other fund and no pre­
determined assumptions should be made. SRI fund members should not 
automatically expect their funds to over or under-perform compared to non-SRI 
. funds, nor should they automatically expect their funds to have certain style 
characteristics. 
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7. APPENDICES 
7.1 Data used for constructing the very small ordinaries index 
Table I 
The proportion of the 
Date S&P/ASX 300 out of the ASX 
3 1  Dec 1 992 
3 1  Dec 1993 
3 1  Dec 1 994 
3 1  Dec 1 995 
31 Dec 1 996 
3 1  Dec 1 997 
31 Dec 1 998 
3 1  Dec 1 999 
All Ordinaries 
92.46 
93. 1 5  
92.50 
92.64 
93.74 
94.9 1  
96.06 
95 .2 1  
Source: Webb (Standard & Poors, personal communication, 6 November 200 1). 
7.2 More observations from the full specific industry table 
Table 12 includes 27 betas. Because of the large number of estimated betas 
these are difficult to interpret individually. Some comments can be made, however, 
on individual exposures, or apparent exposure patterns, to the specific industry 
factors. 
The two Tower Super Ethical funds give betas of twice the magnitude of the 
index betas for the alcohol and tobacco industry. This is very strange, since most SRI 
funds would exclude all included companies. The general funds do, however, give 
betas consistently lower than the index. Exposures to the banks and finance industry 
are consistently very similar to that of the indices. The Australian Ethical fund and 
the Australian Ethical Super Large fund betas for the developers and contractors 
industry (in the last 3-year period) stand out as being very high compared to betas of 
zero for the indices. The Challenger fund betas for the diversified industrials indu-stry 
stand out as quite large compared to betas of zero or at best very low values for the 
other funds and indices. All of the general SRI funds, except for the Challenger SRI 
fund, have consistently larger betas for the diversified resources industry. The 
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superannuation SRI funds indicate an opposite pattern, with betas of mostly zero 
where the index gives betas of around 8% (except for the Australian Ethical Super 
Equities fund which has slightly higher betas). The two Australian Ethical Super 
funds have comparatively high betas for the engineering industry, for which the 
index and the other funds have very low betas. 
A large proportion of the funds, both general and superannuation, have 
consistently higher betas for the healthcare and biotechnology industry. To the extent 
that these results are reliable this may indicate positive screening in this area. The 
Glebe Mid Cap fund has very high betas for the infrastructure and utilities industry, 
for which most of the other funds and indices have zero-value or very small betas. 
The two Tower Ethical funds have higher betas for the media industry than do the 
other funds and indices. Australian Ethical fund, the Australian Ethical Super 
Equities fund and the second of the Tower Super funds have high betas for the other 
metals industry, for which the other fund and index betas are zero or very low. The 
Glebe Mid Cap fund has comparatively higher betas for the retail industry. 
The Australian Ethical fund, the Glebe Mid Cap fund and the two Australian 
Ethical Super funds all have relatively high beta& where the betas for all the other 
fund and indices are zero (or as good as). The Glebe Mid Cap fund and the 
Australian Ethical Super Large fund have higher betas than the others for the 
transport industry. 
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7.3 Correlation Matrices 
7.3.1 Bilateral correlations between variables in the style analysis 
Table 1 1  
Growth Value medium small very small fixed int. cash 
growth 1 .0000 0.6897 0.7 1 78 0. 6682 0.6848 0.30 17  0.0329 
value 0.6897 1 .0000 0.6399 0.599 1 0.7574 0.3400 -0.0903 
medium 0.7 1 78 0.6399 1 .0000 0.8737 0.7022 0.4258 -0.0 1 9 1  
small 0.6682 0.5991 0.8737 1 .0000 0.6679 0.3025 0.0006 
very small 0.6848 0.7574 0.7022 0.6679 1 .0000 0.3002 0.01 37 
fixed int. 0.30 1 7  0.3400 0.4258 0. 3025 0.3002 1 .0000 0.2600 
cash 0.0329 -0.0903 -0.01 9 1  0.0006 0.0 1 37 0.2600 1 .0000 
world 0.5700 0.6065 0.5346 0.5850 0.5883 0. 1 864 -0.0697 
7.3.2 Bilateral correlations between the variables in the style by broad 
industries analysis 
Table Ill 
All Ind. All Res. fixed int. cash world 
All Ind. 1 .0000 0.4942 0.4 1 02 -0.01 49 0.6890 
All Res. 0.4942 1 .0000 0. 1 897 -0.0642 0.4563 
fixed int. 0.4 102 0. 1 897 1 .0000 0.2600 0. 1 864 
cash -0.0149 -0.0642 0.2600 1 .0000 -0.0697 
world 0.6890 0.4563 0. 1 864 -0.0697 1 .0000 
world 
0.5700 
0.6065 
0.5346 
0.5850 
0.5883 
0. 1 864 
-0.0697 
1 .0000 
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7.3.3 Bilateral correlations between the variables in the style by specific industries analysis (Table IV) 
Alcohol & Banks & Building Chemicals Dev. & Diversified Diversified Energy Eng in- Food & Gold Healthcare 
Tobacco Finance Materials Contr. Industrials Resources eering HIH Goods & Biot. 
Alcohol & Tobacco 1 .0000 0.48 1 1  0.3265 0.2873 0.4578 0.3495 0.1439 0.1628 0.3386 0.3 19 1  0.1981 0.3044 
Banks & Finance 0.48 1 1  1 .0000 0.4017 0.37 15 0.5204 0.5060 0.3407 0.3202 0.4295 0.3716 0.2379 0.4635 
Building Materials 0.3265 0.4017 1 .0000 0.4770 0.3346 0.5840 0.3196 0.3225 0.5016 0.3974 0.2 1 37 0.3563 
Chemicals 0.2873 0.37 15  0.4770 1 .0000 0.4286 0.6028 0.27 17 0.3198 0.4722 0.3981 0.3917 0.2461 
Dev. & Contractors 0.4578 0.5204 0.3346 0.4286 1 .0000 0.3762 0.2826 0.2546 0.3430 0.4280 0. 1 856 0.5997 
Div. Industrials 0.3495 0.5060 0.5840 0.6028 0.3762 1.0000 0.3920 0.4645 0.5650 0.3675 0.3061 0.2686 
Div.Resources 0.1439 0.3407 0.3 196 0.2717 0.2826 0.3920 1 .0000 0.4169 0.2234 0.2518  0.2329 0.3046 
Energy 0.1628 0.3202 0.3225 0.3198 0.2546 0.4645 0.4 169 1.0000 0.2808 0.3384 0.2491 0.2637 
Engineering 0.3386 0.4295 0.5016  0.4722 0.3430 0.5650 0.2234 0.2808 1 .0000 0.3674 0.3504 0.4302 
Food & H/HGoods 0.3 1 91 0.3716 0.3974 0.398 1 0.4280 0.3675 0.2518 0.3384 0.3674 1 .0000 0.2163 0.4249 
Gold 0. 1 981 0.2379 0.2137 0.39 17 0.1856 0.3061 0.2329 0.2491 0.3504 0.2163 1 .0000 0.1868 
Healthc. & Biot. 0.3044 0.4635 0.3563 0.2461 0.5997 0.2686 0.3046 0.2637 0.4302 0.4249 0.1868 1 .0000 
Infrastr. & Utilities 0.4823 0.3298 0.2068 0.2867 0.5099 0.32 19 0.2450 0.3334 0.3011 0.4813 0.3718 0.3915 
Insurance 0.4110  0.5262 0.3524 0.3944 0.3729 0.4628 0.2651 0.36 16  0.3677 0.2594 0.3218 0.3699 
Inv. & Fin. Services 0.3400 0.4117 0.3754 0.3791 0.5379 0.5096 0.3806 0.3566 0.4287 0.3342 0.3242 0.5504 
Media 0.1033 0.2693 0.1434 0.0892 0.3456 0. 1 155 0.0955 0.0248 0.1727 0.0551 0.0086 0.1488 
Misc. Industrials 0.1699 0.2838 0.3139 0.3832 0.4802 0.3911 0.3272 0.3 106 0.3703 0.2476 0.2175 0.4794 
Other Metals 0.1681 0.2120 0.3962 0.4060 0.2430 0.4203 0.6175 0.4547 0.4126 0.2915 0.538 1 0.3248 
Paper & Packaging 0.3737 0.4636 0.6356 0.5323 0.4144 0.5350 0.4044 0.3717 0.4789 0.3 1 85 0.2638 0.4374 
Property 0.2964 0.4926 0.2369 0.2089 0.3996 0.2570 0.1712 0.0935 0.1893 0.2445 0.3053 0.4424 
Retail 0.3280 0.4231 0.4138 0.2009 0.3532 0.4501 0.2598 0.3087 0.3478 0.2834 0.1748 0.3724 
Telecom. 0.0363 0. 1080 0.1 195 0.2296 0.2607 0.0664 0.0814 -0.1009 0.2494 0.1277 0.1 085 0.1823 
Tourism & Leisure 0.4486 0.4777 0.2990 0.51 18 0.5753 0.5277 0.2236 0.3624 0.3365 0.5172 0.3895 0.4306 
Transport 0.3652 0.3920 0.2444 0.3408 0.5028 0.3257 0. 1534 0. 1 3 1 1 0.3859 0.2635 0.0884 0.3088 
fixed int. 0.2394 0.2934 0.0977 0. 1 958 0.2251 0.1895 0.1204 0.2650 0.2510  0.28 1 2  0.1784 0.0894 
cash -0.0304 0.0330 -0.0500 -0.0382 -0.01 47 0.0 1 1 8  -0.0244 0.0814 -0.08 1 9  0.1 1 82 -0.1 1 35 0.058 1 
world 0. 19 12  0.4417 0.2984 0.3331 0.4084 0.3254 0.3440 0.2098 0.4096 0.2342 0. 1586 0.2863 
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(cont. ) 
Infrastr. Insurance Inv. & Media Misc. Other Paper & Property Retail Telecom Tour. & Transp. fixed int. cash world 
& Util. Fin. Ser. Indust. Metals Pack. Leisure 
Alcohol & Tobacco 0.4823 0.4 1 10 0.3400 0. 1033 0. 1 699 0. 1 68 1  0.3737 0.2964 0.3280 0.0363 0.4486 0.3652 0.2394 -0.0304 0. 1 9 1 2  
Banks & Finance 0.3298 0.5262 0.4 1 1 7  0.2693 0.2838 0.2 1 20 0.4636 0.4926 0.423 1 0. 1080 0.4777 0.3920 0.2934 0.0330 0.44 1 7  
Building Materials 0.2068 0.3524 0.3754 0. 1434 0.3 1 39 0.3962 0.6356 0.2369 0.4138  0. 1 195 0.2990 0.2444 0.0977 -0.0500 0.2984 
Chemicals 0.2867 0.3944 0.379 1 0.0892 0.3832 0.4060 0.5323 0.2089 0.2009 0.2296 0.5 1 1 8 0.3408 0. 1958 -0.0382 0.3331  
Dev. & Contractors 0.5099 0.3729 0.5379 0.3456 0.4802 0.2430 0.4 144 0.3996 0.3532 0.2607 0.5753 0.5028 0.225 1 -0.0 147 0.4084 
Div. Industrials 0.32 19 0.4628 0.5096 0. 1 155 0.39 1 1 0.4203 0.5350 0.2570 0.4501 0.0664 0.5277 0.3257 0. 1 895 0.01 1 8  0.3254 
Div .Resources 0.2450 0.265 1 0.3806 0.0955 0.3272 0.6175 0.4044 0. 1 7 1 2  0.2598 0.08 14 0.2236 0. 1 534 0. 1 204 -0.0244 0.3440 
Energy 0.3334 0.36 16  0.3566 0.0248 0.3 106 0.4547 0.37 1 7  0.0935 0.3087 -0. 1009 0.3624 0. 1 3 1 1  0.2650 0.08 14 0.2098 
Engineering 0.30 1 1 0.3677 0.4287 0. 1 727 0.3703 0.41 26 0.4789 0. 1 893 0.3478 0.2494 0.3365 0.3859 0.25 10 -0.08 1 9  0.4096 
Food & H/HGoods 0.48 1 3  0.2594 0.3342 0.055 1 0.2476 0.29 15 0.3 185 0.2445 0.2834 0. 1 277 0.5 1 72 0.2635 0.28 1 2  0. 1 1 82 0.2342 
Gold 0.37 1 8  0.32 18  0.3242 0.0086 0.2 1 75 0.5381  0.2638 0.3053 0. 1748 0. 1085 0.3895 0.0884 0. 1 784 -0. 1 1 35 0. 1 586 
Healthc. & B iot. 0.39 15  0.3699 0.5504 0. 1488 0.4794 0.3248 0.4374 0.4424 0.3724 0. 1 823 0.4306 0.3088 0.0894 0.0581  0.2863 
Infrastr. & Utilities 1 .0000 0.3693 0.5 137 -0.0799 0.2307 0.29 10 0.2474 0.6281 0.3782 0.0568 0.5048 0.275 1 0.4264 0. 1868 0.2529 
Insurance 0.3693 1 .0000 0.548 1 0. 1 065 0.4405 0.2738 0.37 1 1  0.4015 0.35 19  0.0258 0.4039 0.303 1 0.3 1 32 0. 1449 0.2765 
Inv. & Fin .  Services 0.5 1 37 0.548 1 1 .0000 0. 3463 0.701 1 0.4566 0.4090 0.3493 0.293 1 0.50 17  0.5091  0.3458 0.2 1 30 -0.0803 0.399 1 
Media -0.0799 0. 1065 0.3463 1 .0000 0.4036 0.0340 0.2005 0. 1 824 0.08 16  0.4258 0. 1 338 0.2329 0.0935 -0.0763 0.4 1 24 
Misc. Industrials 0.2307 0.4405 0.70 1 1 0.4036 1 .0000 0.4064 0.4067 0. 1 358 0.2995 0.59 16 0.3495 0.2487 0.07 15 -0. 1438 0.4746 
Other Metals 0.29 10 0.2738 0.4566 0.0340 0.4064 1 .0000 0.4462 0. 1 9 10 0. 2090 0.2088 0.4 1 37 0.2394 0.0084 -0.0487 0.2782 
Paper & Packaging 0.2474 0.37 1 1  0.4090 0.2005 0.4067 0.4462 1 .0000 0.2955 0.4 1 3 1  0.3661 0.4398 0.2984 0. 1 5 1 7  -0.0989 0.3354 
Property 0.628 1 0.40 15 0.3493 0. 1 824 0. 1 358 0. 19 10  0.2955 1 .0000 0.2439 0. 1052 0.4397 0.2042 0. 3743 -0.0193 0.2643 
Retail 0.3782 0.35 19 0.293 1 0.08 16  0.2995 0.2090 0.4 1 3 1  0.2439 1 .0000 0.0408 0.2996 0.2 105 0. 1 1 7 1  0.0 144 0.2732 
Telecom. 0.0568 0.0258 0.501 7  0.4258 0.59 1 6  0.2088 0.3661 0. 1052 0.0408 1 .0000 0.3964 0.3 1 96 -0.0703 -0. 1 238 0.3649 
Tourism & Leisure 0.5048 0.4039 0.509 1 0. 1 338 0.3495 0.4 1 37 0.4398 0.4397 0.2996 0.3964 1 .0000 0.3752 0. 2434 0.2209 0.3589 
Transport 0.275 1 0.303 1  0.3458 0.2329 0.2487 0.2394 0.2984 0.2042 0.2 105 0.3 196 0.3752 1 .0000 0. 1529 -0.0591 0.3945 
fixed int. 0.4264 0.3 132  0.21 30 0.0935 0.07 15  0.0084 0. 1 5 17  0.3743 0. 1 1 7 1  -0.0703 0.2434 0. 1529 1 .0000 0.2600 0. 1 864 
cash 0. 1 868 0. 1449 -0.0803 -0.0763 -0. 1438 -0.0487 -0.0989 -0.0 193 0.0 144 -0. 1 238 0.2209 -0.0591 0.2600 1 .0000 -0.0697 
world 0.2529 0.2765 0.399 1 0.4 1 24 0.4746 0.2782 0.3354 0.2643 0.2732 0.3649 0.3589 0.3945 0. 1 864 -0.0697 1 .0000 
99 
